Power in Networks: Considering Castells’ Network Society in Egypt’s January 25th
Movement and America’s Occupy Wall Street Movement

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ABSTRACT: Although the Arab Spring and Occupy Wall Street began on two separate continents and with vastly different cultures, and articulated completely disparate demands, they share a few fundamental characteristics. First, the aims of both movements upset the status-quo by calling for wide-ranging change. Protesting for democracy in the Arab world challenged theories of entrenched Arab authoritarianism while Occupy Wall Street loudly decried the relentless acceleration of free-market capitalism. Second, both employed a decentralized, horizontal form of organization that emphasized inclusive and collective decision-making. Finally, social media and other information technologies articulated new identities, mobilized participants and coordinated the movements’ actions. These three characteristics of calling for transformational change, using a network structure and creating a self-conscious identity nearly reflect the social theorist Manuel Castells’ definition of a social movement in a network society. Using the Egyptian revolution’s January 25th movement (the Jan 25 movement) and Occupy Wall Street (OWS) as case studies, I argue that Castells’ theory of a network society successfully describes how social movements are empowered by the network structure to create social change. However, I also argue that Castells’ binary conception of power does not account for the relationship between the overarching power structure that shapes each movement. Instead, Foucault’s analytics of power clarifies how conditions of domination, in the case of Egypt, or subjugation, in the case of OWS, influences the identity created by the protest movement. The constructed identity, in turn, determines the role of the individual within a greater movement. By using Foucault and Castells in tandem, it is possible to better understand both the mechanics of these networked social movements as well as how they differ in mounting resistance to their respective political-economic system.
Introduction: Understanding the Uprisings of 2011

“Are you ready for a Tahrir moment?” read an e-mail sent out on July 13, 2011 by the Vancouver magazine, Adbusters (Chafkin 2012, 74). This message is said to be the catalyst for the Occupy Wall Street (OWS) movement—a protest movement that eventually encompassed the globe, with encampments in over 800 cities and towns. The message itself harkens to Cairo’s Tahrir Square, the epicenter of the Egyptian revolution that began a six months before and ended President Hosni Mubarak’s twenty-year long reign. The e-mail’s author, Adbusters editor Kalle Lasn, said the message was the result of conversations between leftists who watched Egyptians use social media to create their ideal form of revolution. Lasn explains that the OWS movement was meant to enact “soft regime change” in America that targeted both economic and political inequality (Chafkin 2012, 74). These movements were just two of the hundreds of protest movements that overtook the globe in 2011. The media created a grand narrative of the uprisings, epitomized by Time magazine naming a faceless, bandana-wearing “The Protester” as the “Person of the Year” (Andersen et al. 2011, 54-89).

The Time magazine article emphasized the similarities in the tactics, grievances, participants and above all the novelty of the movements while spending little time parsing their individual differences. The protests were global, taking place in the Arab world, Madrid, Athens, London, Tel Aviv, Mexico, India, Chile, China, Russia and the United States. They generally began independently of established political actors, instead being lead by young, educated, tech-savvy middle class activists. They generally fought against “corruption” and for “democracy”—in the sense of a highly participatory, egalitarian and horizontal democracy. This form of democracy was enacted as the movements made their decisions collectively, without a leader. Finally, they all used social media in varying degrees to coordinate both internally and outwardly to observers. The article is meant to be congratulatory; the social movements are presented as a revitalization of protest as a successful form of collective action.

Academic analysis would most likely categorize the protests of 2011 as New Social Movements (NSM) a term originally described movements that center on claims of identity rather than the explicitly economic aims of labor-based movements. These identities do not promote a specific policy nor depend on leadership; their purpose is to create community around an oppressed or ignored social group of society with hopes of creating openings for acceptance and eventual empowerment within the broader social structure (Edelman 2001, 285-317). Examples of NSMs include the international feminism movement, the American civil rights movements or the anti-nuclear movement. A hallmark NSM tactic is prefigurative politics, when the protesters attempt to act out the world as they want it to be (Klein 2011). This may be by sitting in the front of a bus or creating a commune on a potential nuclear power plant site. In the process, NSMs made civil society into a new arena for political contention (Nash 2001, 235). However, the protests of 2011 operated as a hybrid of the social movement typologies—the protesters created their own versions of democracy or economic justice within the confines of public squares. They used the tactics of identity-based NSMs, but applied them to the political-economic system, not just to civil society.
The identity that protest movements express acts recursively—it is at once an expression of individual participants’ internal frustrations but also is determined by the object of contention, which is the perceived cause of that discontent. NSMs usually locate the object of contention as a cultural oppression but in the protests of 2011 the larger political economic systems were contested. The January 25th movement called for the ousting of their dictator but wrapped up in that claim was that the Mubarak regimes’ crony capitalism had failed to provide for the whole of society. To garner support, the message of the revolution was that all Egyptians deserved dignity. For their part, OWS protesters expressed their frustration at the influence of the economic elite in American democracy. Accordingly, they rallied around the slogan, “We are the 99%,” allowing any person to identify with the movement. However, OWS did not articulate any clear demands but allowed each individual protester to profess their own meaning of the movement. In order to challenge the larger systems of oppression, both movements organized themselves as a leaderless network.

A network, broadly defined, is a web-like structure of nodes, or centers, connected to one another. Networks can grow without limits; connecting nodes is an endlessly repeating process. Compared to hierarchies, there is no leader or base. Networks expand according to their own particular logic and it is this logic which determines what nodes are members and what relationships are allowed. Social networks are “a collection of actors that pursue repeated, enduring exchange relations with one another and, at the same time, lack a legitimate organizational authority to arbitrate and resolve disputes that may arise during the exchange” (Podolny and Page 1997, 59 qtd in Stalder 2006, 177). Absent of an authority or hierarchy, the key obstacle for networks is coordinating actions and so strong methods of communication are key for successful mobilization.

One social theorist, Manuel Castells, proposed in 1996 that the world is increasingly becoming a “network society.” Observing the revolutions in information technology, the crisis of industrialism and the proliferation of “freedom-oriented” movements, Castells posited that society is shifting from a fundamentally hierarchical structure to the network is “the new social morphology of our societies” (Castells 1997, 469). Accordingly, there are no longer levels of power, as in a hierarchy. Instead, power is binary; you are either excluded or included from a given network. Within this theory, Castells gives social movements priority as the sole sources of social change. Castells falls broadly into the camp of New Social Movement theorists, describing social movements in a network society as embracing new identities and eventually creating structural openings. Castells’ theory presciently describes many of the more salient aspects of the social movements of 2011—their use of technology, hybridization of identity, opposition to systematic oppression and of course, use of a network structure.

While Castells framework successfully addresses how that movements form and operate, when applied to the case studies it fails to explain why the experience of the individual protester differed greatly. Both of the movements operate as networked social movements by employing a decentralized organizational structure and articulating an identity that challenges the larger system. However, within each movement, there are fundamentally
different relations of power. In the Egyptian revolution, the individual is obscured by larger calls for dignity and nationalism. In contrast, OWS’s message is individualized so that each protester has an equal amount of power. In both cases, protesters are members of their respective “networks,” or social movement. However, reducing power to membership overlooks the reality differences between individual Egyptian protesters were concealed while the distinctions between OWS protesters were exalted. Castells does not account for how a movement’s identity can exert its own power—it may totalize the masses under one message or may highlight divisions between individual participants.

I use a very circumscribed understanding of Foucault’s analytics of power to argue that the differences in each movement’s identities stems from the fundamentally different power structures within which they operate. Foucault distinguishes between relations of subjugation—when there is a possibility for the one that is controlled to resist—and domination—when the subject cannot resist. Egypt is fighting against monolithic domination by a repressive regime and thus must create a comprehensive identity to gain any freedom. OWS, in comparison, was born in a society of “free subjects,” living in a competitive democracy. As such, these subjects, or protesters, are fully empowered to create their own identity. Examining these forms of resistance brings attention to the way that the overlaying power structure—domination or power—determines the role of the individual within the network. By considering a holistic understanding of power it is possible to fully interrogate how power may be created using the network form.

**Literature Review: New Social Movements and their Theorists**

New Social Movements (NSM) occupy a complex place within the study of social movements because they are both a type and a theory of contentious politics. In general, social movements are “loose networks of organizations, groups and individuals which contest dominant interpretations of events or practices and construct collective identities to transform everyday life” (Nash 2001, 235). NSMs take this definition to the extreme by organizing protest networks around oppressed identities rather than a specific political or economic policy. The protests usually have layered messages—the inaugural NSM was the anti-Vietnam war protests that decried violence while also criticizing a prevailing culture of conformity. The existence of NSMs challenged the Marxist idea that class conflict explains most of contentious politics, not cultural issues (Martin 2002, 81; Johnston et al. 1994, 7). In response, a new field of scholarship emerged to try to explain the advent of identity-based movements. NSMs and the accompanying social theorists implicitly feel that expressing a collective identity through a decentralized, leaderless movement can create lasting change. As Melucci (1985) puts it, “I am convinced…that these poor, disenchanted forms of action are the seeds of qualitative change in contemporary collective action.” (809-810 qtd in Martin 2002, 76). NSMs have no specific orientation, they may fall anywhere on the political spectrum and can be global, national or local, or operate simultaneously on each of these parameters. Their most distinguishing features are their network structure and focus on identity and culture.

1 In general, when I mention “oppression” I am not claiming it is a fact, instead I’m indicating that the group in question perceives themselves to be oppressed.
The structure of NSMs purposefully challenges any authority, be it within or outside of the movement. In social movement terminology they are decentralized, horizontal and fluid. In theory, they do not rely on a leader but make decisions collectively, either informally or through participatory debate. This is in sharp contrast to the “Leninist” model of working-class movements, which is inspired by Lenin’s call for professional revolutionaries to lead the Russian revolution (Johnston et al. 1994, 8). Pichardo explains that the non-rigid, anti-bureaucratic structure is intentional because NSMs “are more responsive to the needs of the individuals….Motivated by the lessons of the past, they hope to avoid becoming co-opted or deradicalized” (Pichardo 1997, 416). NSMs are consciously constructed to empower individuals while evading opposition to ensure their survival.

Beyond the decentralized structure, NSMs are distinguished by their use of identity to change the social structure. There is some debate about whether a movement can be categorized as a NSM if it goes beyond asserting and identity to demand political and/or economic change. Theorists such as Melucci and Touraine define NSMs as only existing within civil society and not engaging with established economic or political actors (Nash 2001, 235). Nash (2001) argues that this is an unnecessary limitation because NSMs are ultimately distinguished by their main aim to open society up to new identities, which may be through the articulation of an oppressed identity or by the promotion of a certain policy. Regardless of the end goal, these identities focus on symbolic issues and attempt to assert autonomy rather than maximize power (Johnston et al. 1994, 7; Buechler 1995, 442; Martin 2002, 81). The Jan 25 movement and OWS both express identities that were not recognized in dominant society—the democratic Egyptian and the disenfranchised American—to challenge their respective systems. Through the articulation of these identities they aim to change in the larger political economic structure, making them a hybridization of an identity-based movement that goes beyond the cultural realm.

NSM theorists share the fundamental assumption that society has become “post-industrial” or an “information society,” in which economic production, enabled by new technology, shifts to the production of knowledge. Accordingly, social movements move from material claims to identity-based claims as Melucci (1989) explains, “[t]he freedom to have which characterized…industrial society has been replaced by the freedom to be” (qtd in Johnston et al. 1994, 9). NSM theorists are a diverse body of scholars from a range of backgrounds, including Jurgen Habermas, Alberto Melucci, Alaine Touraine and, of course, Manuel Castells. The theorists create complementary, yet divergent predictions of how technology, identity, information and society become alternating repressive or empowering forces in this new epoch.

I will summarize the work of Melucci and Touraine—who both proposed contrastive methods of studying social movements—to contextualize Castells’ own theory of the information age. Touraine believes that classes will no longer struggle over the production of goods but instead over the production of culture, which he calls “historicity”—the capacity of society to create and recreate itself (Foweraker, 1995, 12). He developed a method of “Sociological Intervention,” which aimed to discover the higher meaning of a social movement within society. Melucci, on the other hand,
critiques Touraine for attempting to essentialize social movements, believing they could better be studied as changing social constructs. However, Melucci has a similar conception of contemporary society. He specifically sees NSMs as challenging the “technoscientific apparatus, agencies of information and communication, and the decision-making centers that determine policies wield their power over these domains,” by manipulating information and communication production to construct their own social meanings (Melucci 1994, 101). For Melucci, expanding public discourse, deploying new cultural symbols and integrating subversive identities are acts of protest that challenge the normative information disseminated through mass media or national propaganda. While Touraine and Melucci use different methodologies, they both create worlds in which social movements defend culture through identity creation in the face of the totalizing and dominating forces of post-industrial society.

Critics of NSM theorists level three main claims against the movements and their theory—first, the definition of NSM as a typology is vague; second, society has not changed substantially enough to merit being deemed a new stage of society; and third, the movements themselves are not indicative of the changes in society (Pichardo 1997; Calhoun 1994; Nash 2001; Martin 2002). The third point is most pertinent because it puts NSMs into a broader context of social movement history while continuing to focus upon the role of identity. Calhoun (1994) argues that NSMs are actually a continuation of identity politics (Calhoun 1994, 9-36). He finds that social movements from centuries ago, such as the women’s rights movement are equally as concerned with identity-creation as are NSMs. To Calhoun (1994), the emphasis on grandiose social theory has reduced the relationship between identity and society into “the individual as a locus of interior feelings that need to be expressed in identity claims and society as the exterior source of pressures for conformity” (23). In comparison to identity politics, NSM theories ignore the individuals’ agency to affect society and the various roles that society plays beyond an enforcer of orthodoxy. Adding to this idea, Martin (2002) contends that in many contemporary movements, especially those in the global south, “traditional” issues persist such as material redistribution and citizens rights (81-82). NSMs as a typology may simply be a new phrase for identity politics, which disregards other contemporary movements that exist outside of the western world.

NSM theory assembles key features for understanding the Jan 25 movement and OWS by highlighting the importance of structure and identity within the movements. Additionally, Melucci and Touraine highlight the various ways of interpreting identity-based social movements within contemporary society. OWS and The Jan 25 movement could both be seen as creating new forms of “being” within oppressive societies that increasingly traffic in information as the basis of production. However, as the critiques of social movement theory make clear, these movements should not be considered unprecedented in human history. Therefore, I am framing my case studies using the work of Manuel Castells’ who believes identity politics are an enduring part of all politics (Stalder 2006, 77). Castells claims that contemporary society breaks with the past because the fundamental structure of society has moved to being a network (Stalder 2006, 5). This argument is more compelling to discuss OWS and the Jan 25 movement because it focuses on form rather than differing types of conflict to provide an understanding of the two movements. I will
look at how the Jan 25 movement and OWS have structured their movements similarly yet their exact forms have been influenced by differing power structures.

Manuel Castells and the Network Society
Castells’ theory of the network society comes from his trilogy *The Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture*, which is comprised of *The Rise of the Network Society* (1996), *The Power of Identity* (1997), and *End of Millenium* (1998), totaling over 1,200 pages. It is further developed in his subsequent works, such as *Communication Power* (2009), as well as several essays and compilations on the subject. He draws mainly on tangible events saying, “I do not consider myself a theorist. I am an empirical sociologist…who tries to makes sense of observations with whichever theoretical tools are available and shift into making new ones when I feel the need” (Roberts 1999, 33-39).

According to Castells, the network society arises from three “accidental coincidences:” the information technology revolution, the crisis of industrialism in both Western capitalism and Soviet statism and finally the emergence of “freedom oriented” social movements (Stadler 2006, 3).

Castells sees the network as the basis for a new social “logic” that operates using power relations of exclusion and inclusion.

“The inclusion/exclusion in networks, and the architecture of relationships between networks, enacted by light-speed operating information technologies, configure dominant process and functions in our society…Switches connecting the networks…are the privileged instruments of power. Thus the switchers are the power holders….“ (1996, 470-71).

Power is an on and off switch. Those included in networks become the power-holders who guard access while others are disenfranchised. Nodes that efficiently specialize according to the logic of the network become greater power holders through a feedback loop (Castells 1997, 374). This can happen on multiple levels—Hong Kong has become a global financial center which is strengthened as its currency becomes one of the most highly traded in the world; the Mayo Clinic in Rochester, MN, attracts good researchers and thus continues to innovate, thereby further increasing its prestige; Damien Hirst, the contemporary artist, becomes famous through media coverage, in turn his prices rise, garnering him more fame. The excluded, however, have little opportunity to gain entrance into a network. A computer-illiterate man cannot enter into the Hong Kong financial system; nor can another artist imitate Hirst and expect the same success. Hong Kong finances requires technological saavy while the contemporary art world requires an imprecise mix of irony, creativity and bravado. However, it must be noted that Hong Kong, the Mayo Clinic and Damien Hirst do not hold any intrinsic power. Their power is derived from their respective network’s logic, be it that of the global financial system, the field of medical research or the contemporary art world. In exclusionary/inclusionary power relationships, the logic of the network acts as a dominating force by determining membership and therefore power.

Power is ever-present yet immaterial in a network society, but there remains the possibility of social change through alternate networks. Castells (1997) concurs

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2 This phrase will be shortened to in/ex power throughout the remainder of the paper.
with the NSM idea that identity is a form of power but maps it onto the network, saying new power relations depend on “the capacity to control global instrumental networks on the basis of specific identities” (305), and goes on to claim power is “in people’s minds” (359). However, the network does not simply dominate, Castells (1997) believes that “following the old law of social evolution, resistance confronts domination, empowerment reacts against powerlessness, and alternative projects challenge the logic embedded in the new global order” (69). Power is deployed through identity, but there is always the possibility for new identities to create alternative networks of power, also known as social movements. This logic comes to bear as Castells’ applies his theory the tangible realms of production, experience and power, which corresponds with economics, society and politics, respectively.

The economy in a network society is increasingly informational, global and composed of networks, which makes it ever more uncontrollable and dynamic. The economy itself is still distinctly capitalistic, however firms now compete to process and create knowledge more efficiently instead of material items. Information is a unique economic resource. It is liberated from scarcity because it is capable of endlessly creating new products with the same source material. Castells calls this shift “informationalism,” and with it the economy is best adapted to a flexible and decentralized network that enables flows of information. Castells cites the dominance of global financial markets, multinational corporations and the proliferation of fragmented, loosely connected firms as the vanguard of the networked economy (Crozier 2002, 3). OWS and the Jan 25 movement both occurred in the aftermath of the global financial crisis of 2008, arguably the result of the volatility of a networked economy. This crisis’ causes are still debatable, but the cascade of financial collapses across the globe highlighted the interconnectedness and fragility of the world’s economic centers. The ensuing debt crisis demonstrated how much of the financial system is bound up in deals that only exist in the ether of information technology. Castells’ theory of a networked economy is well suited to explain the financial collapse and economic uncertainty that surround OWS and the Jan 25 movement.

In the realm of politics, Castells imagines the state as the center of power, however, its importance is increasingly contested in a network society creating an overall crisis of political institutions. Castells (2000) uses a Weberian concept of power in which the state maintains and enforces domination through legitimatization (8). However, the nation-state is losing importance as borders become increasingly permeable for economic and social actors. Nation-states will be demoted from sovereign powers to merely strategic actors, and become network states (Stalder 2006). Castells only gives a vague definition of a network state as being “made out of a complex web of power-sharing, and negotiated decision-making between international, multinational, national, regional, local and nongovernmental, political institutions” (Castells 2000, 693-699). In domestic politics, most traditional power-holders are almost irrelevant to citizens, including institutions, social organizations, economic actors and symbolic controllers such as the church or corporate media (Castells, 1997, 359). Egypt and the United States both have power that
extends beyond their borders, but are also members of international organizations that, theoretically, subsume their sovereignty. The protesters of OWS and the Jan 25 movement focused on challenging their domestic political institutions, a result of a networked politics increasingly based upon relationship between actors rather than a preordained hierarchy.

Culture becomes similarly rearranged and increasingly dependent on “electronically-based communication” creating “real virtuality.” Castells (1997) describes “real virtuality” as “a system in which reality itself (that is, people’s material/symbolic existence) is entirely captured, fully immersed in a virtual image setting…in which appearances are not just on the screen through which experience is communicated, but they become the experience” (Castells, 373). In real virtuality—as opposed to virtual reality—the human experience plays out entirely in worlds that exist in communication mediums, such as social networking, image sharing websites or Internet dating, all of which postdate Castells’ theory. As institutions crumble, the creation of identity falls to the individual as a way to form communities in a cacophonous society (Castells 1996, 3-4). OWS and the Jan 25 movement both first articulated their identity in the real virtuality of Facebook pages, e-mails and other social media, arenas that later acted as the catalyst of mobilization. OWS and the Jan 25 movement succeeded in translating identities expressed in “real virtuality” into physical, sustained protests.

When these identities are aggregated into social movements they are, according to Castells, the only basis for social change in a network society. Castells defines social movements as “purposive collective action whose outcome, in victory as in defeat, transform values and institutions of society” (2004 [1997], 3) Felix Stadler (2006) a specialist on Manuel Castells, gives a concise summary of social movements in a network society (77-81). First, social movements are self-conscious, a marker meant to differentiate them from other forms of collective action. Their meaning is created through their actions but that meaning may only be understandable to their members, or may be changed depending on the audience. Second, they act autonomously. They are constrained by their surroundings but their internal logic and values are not derived from other forces. Third, the success or failure of a social movement is inconsequential, their eventual dissipation or cooptation is all but inevitable. Instead, their very existence and articulation of an oppositional identity is sufficient to affect cultural values. Fourth, they articulate oppositional identities; there is no such thing as a dominant social movement. These characteristics at once place social movements in opposition to dominant networks of power, but by creating an alternate, independent network they can create social change.

Social movements are empowered by the network structure. As Castells (1997) says, “the main agency detected in our journey across the lands inhabited by social movements, it is a networking, decentered form of organization and intervention, characteristic of new social movements mirroring and counter-acting, the networking logic of domination in the informational society (362). Castells is harkening to the NSM typology of a decentralized structure, but justifies the structure as mirroring societal level changes. Furthermore, the meaning of a particular movement can change depending on context, giving it broader power to attract a wide-range of members. As information diffusion
becomes increasingly accessible, more social movements may come from marginalized sectors of society. The Jan 25 movement and OWS are proof-positive that the symptoms of a network society—an unstable political and economic environment and a culture of real virtuality—can lead to uprisings of the dispossessed.

Castells uses the quasi-mystical phrases “space of flows” and “timeless time” to describe the shifts in the fundamental logic of society. Traditionally, space is the physical place where social practices occur. However, aided by new technologies, these social practices take place even if the participants are separated by distance. This may be a conversation between family members in different countries through Skype, a business deal conducted by a transnational corporation or an anti-globalization activist network coordinating on the Internet. In each of these cases, the participants are acting out social practices and even occupying the same “time” but not the same place. The character of time has evolved to be, in the words of Bromley “time without socially meaningful ordered sequence and subject to individually random perturbations” (Bromley 1999, 6-17). This new ordering of space and time, however, still operates according to the in/ex power of the network.

The space of flows is controlled by elites while the majority of the population continues to be kept in a space of places exacerbating the division between the members of a network and the excluded. Castells and Henderson (1986) summarize this experience with the phrase: “contradiction between placeless power and powerless places” (7, qtd in Stalder 2006, 150). The OWS claim that “We are the 99%” was pointed at the elites that have a disproportionate amount of power. The Jan 25 movement, meanwhile challenged the cronies of Mubarak that effectively ruled Egypt’s supposedly democratic society. However, as the two movements related with their international participants, they were similarly entering into an alternate “space of flows” and operating within a timeless time. “Space of flows” and “timeless time” Castells demonstrate the full extent of a network society and gives context to the in/ex power of the network society.

Critiques of Castells: Towards an Understanding of Power
Castells’ wide-ranging theory has an extensive range of critics that take issue with his imprecise theories and definitions, tendency towards technological determinism and/or with the very notion that we have entered a new society (Nyíri 2006; Bromley 1999; Webster 1997). There are other proponents of the network society, most notably Jans van Dijk, author of The Network Society (1999), who calls Castells’ iteration “one-dimensional” because it ignores individual agency defines “networks” so broadly that they become meaningless (van Dijk 1999, 143). Many of these criticisms are valid, however they are aimed at the network society as a plausible way to predict or explain contemporary society. As has been discussed, Castells’ description of a “networked” society, politics and economy is useful in describing the world in 2011. In order to apply a theory to different case studies, there must be a certain level of imprecision to allow for interpretation.
When considering social movements in a network society, however, I find that in/ex power myopically focusing on membership in a network, overlooking the role of individual participants and the greater political context. Kate Nash, a political sociologist, proposes that a form of “cultural politics” relying upon Foucault’s analytics of power should be applied to Castells’ network society. Nash (2001) argues that Castells misrepresents his own notion of power by stating that power through identity is enacted in people’s minds (237). Rather, Castells uses examples that do not locate power in thoughts but in following cultural codes during social interactions. Nash explains “[p]ower must be seen, then, as embedded in the practices which, reproduced over time and space, constitute the material social structures of *The Information Age*” (238). Power does not follow a binary of whether an individual is a member in a network or not. Instead, membership is created through social practice by exercising skills to warrant inclusion but also by being conscious of his or her membership. This echoes Foucault’s (1982) conception that a “subject”—an individual in a power relationship—is twofold, “subject to someone else’s control and dependence, and tied to his own identity by a conscience and self-knowledge” (781). Foucault brings together both the individual, as a “subject” into a more holistic understanding of power relations.

The type of subject, however, depends upon whether the individual is in a relation of power or a relation of domination. As Nash explains “free subjects” exist in a specific form of power relations “where there is the possibility of resistance, where subjects are not fully determined but may realize different possibilities from the range with which they are faced, that is meaningful to think of power.” (240). In a relation of subjugation, the oppressed may become the oppressor. In a relation of domination, however, there is little possibility of resistance. Nash draws on Hindess’ understanding of Foucault’s domination as a “particular structure or power in which antagonisms are consolidated in hierarchical and stable relations” (240). In sum, an individual may “subjugated” but capable of resistance while a dominated individual has no chance of becoming the dominator.

However, domination is not necessarily forever. Foucault (1982) connects the type of power relation with forms of successful resistance. He uses the phrase “relations of strategy” to describe both how power is exerted but also how resistance can be created. Again, there is a distinction in the sort of resistance possible under “subjugation” and “domination.” Combating domination, like domination itself, “manifests in a massive, universalizing form, at the level of the whole social body….,” (795). In order to successfully resist domination, the entire polity must unite to confront it. In contrast, subjugation does not specify a reciprocal strategy but “[e]very power relationship implies, at least in potentia, a strategy of struggle, in which the two forces are not super-imposed, do not lose their specific nature, or do not finally become confused” (794). In terms of social movements, resistance may take on any variation of identity if it is acting against subjugation. However, if a movement is trying to defy domination, it must mobilize a massive body of resistance.
The division between these two terms—domination and power—becomes important as I examine the case studies. The identity articulated by each social movement is directly in response to the object of contention or, in Foucault’s terms, the relation of power. Through an analysis of the two movements in a network society, I find that the individual agency within each movement differs greatly depending upon whether the participants are dominated or free subjects. This relationship is not possible to explain using Castells’ binary understanding of power as simply inclusionary or exclusionary.

**Questions of Investigation**

Drawing from Castells’ own empirical methodology as well as his definition of a social movement, I have identified key questions to interrogate how the Jan 25 movement and OWS operate as networked social movements.

*What structural openings allowed these movements to exist?*

Structural openings are the opportunities available in politics, economics or in culture that enable or allow a social movement to surface. Injustice does not always create a protest. There is no single “opening” or grievance that creates a protest movement, the point of examining the political, social and economic ecology as a whole is to avoid easy causality. Clearly, there must be an “object of contention” which impels a movement to be created, which may be any form of injustice. In these particular case studies, it is important to note both oppose the political-economic system, forming the overall power structure. The object of contention of a movement is not always the relations of power but in these cases they are one and the same. By recognizing the spaces and grievances that allow a movement to emerge, the next step is to understand that movements are self-conscious creations.

*What identity do these movements articulate? What does it oppose?*

This question is rooted in Castells’ particular definition of a social movement as creating social change by expressing new identities. The identity, however, must be in opposition to something—be it a tax on the wealthy, bigotry against racial groups or a social rejection of types of sexuality. Identity is not simply an assertion of “who we are,” it is an exercise in locating a movement in relation to the rest of society. An “object of contention,” can be opposed with identities that are militant, nonviolent, tolerant or exclusive and so forth. In my understanding, oppositional identity encompasses both what the movement is protesting and also how it carries out that protest.

*How does the movement act as a network?*

Drawing upon previous definitions of a network as being horizontal and leaderless, I will look at how each movement communicated within itself and to the outside world. The decision-making process indicates how power flows through the movement. In addition, I will examine how different layers interact, including international, nation, local, political and nonpolitical networks, to create a protest. The structure of the movement is also a space to understand the role of technology in coordinating with others.
Finally, as I look at each of these movements I will focus on their beginnings. As Castells says, along with other NSMs theorists, the most important act of a social movement is to exist, not whether the movement is able to achieve its stated demands.

**Case Study: The Egyptian Revolution**
The protests of 2011 began in December of 2010, when a fruit vendor, Mohamed Bouazizi, set himself on fire causing protests to erupt across Tunisia. The ensuing uprisings of the Arab Spring spread geographically from North Africa’s Atlantic Coast to the Arabian Peninsula, affecting monarchies and republics alike with protest in both rural and urban areas. It took the entire world by surprise because the majority of the Arab world has been under some form of authoritarianism despite popular support for democracy (Gause 2011, 82; Brumberg 2008, 56). Egypt’s revolution was one of the most spectacular of the Arab Spring, and arguably the most successful; Tahrir Square became shorthand for populist, decentralized uprisings capable of toppling dictators. The Egyptian revolution and the subsequent global uprisings followed a similar model of organizing through Twitter, Facebook and other social media however they were met with varying degrees of oppression from regimes. Beginning with Egypt as a case study is a starting point to consider the evolution of the protests of 2011.

**Openings in a Liberalized Autocracy**
One of the foremost scholars on democracy in the Arab world, David Brumberg, rationalizes the durability of repressive states in the Arab world as “liberalized autocracy.” He describes this regime as “a set of interdependent institutional, economic, ideological, social, and geostrategic factors has created an adaptable ecology of repression, control, and partial openness.” (Brumberg 2002, 56). Liberalized autocracies create small allowances to their population to express their grievances, such as symbolic protests or publishing a dissident newspaper. If the opposition movement oversteps their bounds, the regimes temporarily restricts freedom as a reminds of the regime’s ultimate power. Eventually, however, the regime will make some concessions again, beginning the cycle anew. However, in the winter of 2011, there were structural openings outside of the regime’s control that contributed to the emergence of the Jan 25 movement.

The most popular explanation for the Egyptian revolution is increasing Internet access. Wael Ghonim, a Google executive that created what became the Jan 25 movement’s primary Facebook page is quoted saying “If you want to free a society, just give them Internet access” (Khamis and Vaugh 2011, 1). The basic premise is that social media and other Internet-based technology allowed protesters to circumvent oppressive the regimes and coordinate to overthrow the dictators. However this theory is partially debunked by the fact that there is no relation between Internet density and the occurrence of revolts in the Middle East (Saletan 2011). In Egypt in particular, only 5% of the nation’s 85 million citizens use Facebook (Srinivasan, 2011). These statistics tell us that while the Internet was not necessarily a causal factor, it enabled a more revolutionary segment of the population. Instead, there were economic, political and demographic realities that impelled Egyptians, and Arabs across the world to protest against injustices.
In 2011, the Arab world was in the midst of a “youth bulge,” meaning a high proportion of the population was between 15 and 29 years old. Political scientists and demographers report that the tipping point is when youth make up 35% and 40% of the overall population (Hvistendahl 2011, 552-554). The theory gained legitimacy after the Arab Spring—Egypt’s youth bulge was 43%, Tunisia and Bahrain had 38% and Yemen’s was at 53%, according to United Nation’s estimates for 2010 (Hvistendahl 2011, 552). Youth, especially those who are educated, are more likely to engage in political protest for many reasons—they have less to lose and more to gain and they have been informed by democratic, liberal ideas through their education (Cottle, 2011, 650).

In addition, a vast majority of these young people were unemployed. The global economic crisis further exacerbated the economic hardship in the Arab world (Bajrektarevic 2011, 104). Two days before the Egyptian protests began the International Monetary Fund warned that Egypt’s 25% youth unemployment rate could lead to civil unrest (Talley 2011). Across the Arab world, Gause (2011) finds that countries engaged in Washington-consensus economic reforms suffered from high levels of inequality and extensive crony capitalism (84). This stunted both the regime’s legitimacy but also their ability to control protests. By following these policies, Egypt became included in the network of liberalized economies, even though the total population did not significantly benefit. As Castells explains, membership in a network creates power, so the regime prioritized being included with the liberalizing superpowers over the material wellbeing of its citizens. In the process, it reinforced a group of elites that benefited from these policies, creating their own domestic power networks.

Beyond economic strains on the population, Egyptians had been increasingly exposed to the ideal of democracy through the media, western, Arab and Internet-based. Western entertainment has infiltrated the globe, which Cottle (2011) argues has “contributed to the globalization of values and tenets of economic liberalism and liberal democracy” (650). Many of the people of the Arab world support democracy as a political system; Gause (2011) observes that when given real election choices there is a high voter turnout (82). In addition to western-generated media, Al-Jazeera, the Qatari news network, broadcast news of the revolutions across the Arab world and the globe. Beyond mass media, Khamis and Vaughn (2011) argue that the Internet is one of the most important spaces in which public opinion trends and public spheres are both shaped and expressed in modern Arab societies (5). Bayat (2011) finds that the demographic group that is most active on the Internet—mainly youth but also those who are individualistic and aligned with values of modernity—are most likely to engage in political protest. Through exposure to democracy as a way of life that on the screen, or in real virtuality, its potency as a symbol moves from a foreign concept to a familiar form of government. Put plainly, Egyptians knew what democracy looked like and knew they did not have it.

For Middle Eastern scholars, the Arab Spring is puzzling because it debunked the theory of entrenched Arab authoritarianism. Brumberg’s notion of liberalized autocracy is one product of this scholarship. Beyond Orientalist ideas that autocracy is endemic to Arab culture, the prevailing justification is that an axis of resource wealth, a strong military security complex and an imposed lack of civil society allow regimes to maintain their
power. Gause (2011) contends that the Arab Spring mobilized these supposedly static relationship into a dynamic one, and also introduces the importance of a pan-Arab identity. In Egypt, as it became clear that a large part of the population were sympathetic to the protesters, the military broke their allegiance with Mubarak’s regime. Furthermore, the regime did not have enough funds to placate the masses with government handouts. In Gauses’ estimation, Mubarak’s regime failed to account for the economic and political injustices and the well-institutionalized military filled the power vacuum. Essentially, Gause is describing a crisis of institutions, a hallmark of Castells’ network society. The networks of elites that ruled Egypt began to split apart, creating an opportunity for the protesters.

In contrast to other Arab countries, Egypt had enjoyed a relatively high level of freedom of expression including a loose group of oppositional parties (Anderson 2011, 7). Individually these parties failed to garner sufficient support to challenge the regime but collectively they contributed their organizing capabilities to the movement. These include the Muslim Brotherhood, a banned Islamist political party, the Kefaya (Enough) movement, which began with state-sanction protests against the Palestine and Iraq occupations, Ayman Nour’s political party, founded on liberal democratic principles and concerns about human rights, as well as the April 6th movement, which was first concerned with labor rights (Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 8). Khamis and Vaughn (2011) cite Muslim Brotherhood member saying that the existing political groups failed to create real change because they had not achieved public mobilization on a mass scale (14). Brumberg cynically observes that these parties were purposefully allowed because they create a dissonance between factions while the regime can retain the appearance of stability and openness (2002, 61). However, these activists formed a fledgling alternative network to challenge the regime.

The structural openings that led to the Egyptian revolution are indicative of the “space of flows” through which power travels in a network society. While the elites have “placeless power,” traditional activists occupied “powerless places.” Within the Egyptian elites, power was accumulated based upon allegiance to the regime as well as the promotion of Washington-consensus style economic policy. At the grassroots level, however, networks were beginning to form between a segment of the youth population that shared a common profile: unemployed, educated and with liberal values. Within this movement, the major power holders were the technology-savvy who were able to express themselves through social media. The activists accumulated their own power in the realm of real virtuality by disseminating images of a democratic Egypt and creating a space for free discourse. However, while the Egyptian protesters were able to gain power through the Internet, it must be remembered that this was their only method of expressing their discontent. The political, economic and civil society realms were entirely dominated by the regime through a liberalized autocracy. In order to translate the discontent that existed in the virtual world into physical protest, activists had to coalesce into an oppositional identity.
Creating an Oppositional Identity
As the story goes, the Egyptian Revolution was organized through a Facebook page called “Kullena Khaled Said” or “We Are All Khaled Said” (Vargas 2012, Khamis and Vaughn 2011). Khaled Said was a young Egyptian man who was brutally beaten and killed by Egyptian police officers. The Facebook page was created by Wael Ghomin on June 8, 2010 who felt “Khaled Said was a young man just like me, and what happened to him could have happened to me…All young Egyptians had long been oppressed, enjoying no rights in our own homeland” (Vargas 2012) In this statement, Ghomin encapsulates the Egyptian revolution’s primary identity of dignity for all. The Egyptian revolution utilized sweeping language that pointed to a common enemy rather than distinguishing between members. The first protest on the 25 of January co-opted “Celebrating Egyptian Police Day — January 25” to “January 25: Revolution Against Torture, Poverty, Corruption and Unemployment.” As Ghomin, explains, “We needed to have everyone join forces: workers, human rights activists, government employees and others who had grown tired of the regime’s policies…If the invitation to take to the streets had been based solely on human rights, then only a certain segment of Egyptian society would have participated” (2012). Furthermore, “dignity”—a rallying point echoed throughout the Arab world—does is not part of an ideology but is a state of being tantamount to a human right. The movement implicates the government in violating this right and so creates an identity that collectively orients its members against Mubarak’s regime.

Dignity moved from being values to an identity, but the Egyptian revolution also used a preexisting identity—Egyptian nationalism. Egyptian flags were present at every rally and protestors sang the national anthem. This was a conscious decision; the “We are all Khaled Said” Facebook page instructed: “Egyptian flags only, no political emblems, no violence” (Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 15). The national identity served as a powerful way to obscure other factions that may be divisive within the movement such as Islamist movements or more radical political activists. Nationalism as a touchpoint made the revolution seem like a reclaiming of Egyptian identity through revolution, rather than revolt being a violent break with the past.

The intertwined identities of nationalism and dignity are present in the stated demands of the protesters, which are similarly vague and all-encompassing. Before the January 25th protest, a pamphlet was circulated that gave advice on both what the group was protesting for and how to protest. The demands named are uncontroversial: “1. The downfall of the regime of Hosni Mubarak and his ministers, 2. The cessation of Emergency Law 3. Freedom 4. Justice 5. The formation of a new, non-military government with the interests of the Egyptian people at heart. 6. The constructive administration of all of Egypt’s resources” (Madrigal 2011). Interestingly, these demands speak using a collective “we” that is only specified as “the Egyptian people”. The authors of demands are anonymous, partially out of safety but also because the Jan 25 movement did not have any intentionally appointed leaders, only “accidental leaders”. Khamis and Vaughn (2011) argue that the lack of the leaders “is further evidence that it was a genuine express of the public’s will” (10). A less sanguine reading indicates that these identities only operated to
unite the Egyptian citizens together. Intentionally, the identity of the Jan 25 movement was a collective yet singular identity that did not recognize any individuals within the movement.

The identity of a united Egypt against Mubarak was also broadcast to an international audience. Castells argues that social movements are capable of articulating many different meanings on various levels. The Jan 25 movement adopted the global image of a protester. The aforementioned pamphlet also provided instruction about proper protest clothing—including a scarf for tear gas and a rose for peace—as well as the instructions to always use “a positive message.” The tactics the movement used clearly mirror and draw from the tactics of former revolutionaries. This image was perpetuated throughout the protests as activists tweeted updates in English, hoping to attract international sympathy to their cause. The protesters not only created an identity to mobilize supporters at home, but they also engaged in the culture of real virtuality by collectively representing the movement to an international audience.

The Jan 25 movement employed was a powerful, yet simple identity that the oppressed Egyptian people deserved dignity, and was oppositional in only one direction—against Mubarak. It even incorporated political parties that follow distinct, sometimes incompatible ideologies. It speaks to the power of the anti-Mubarak identity that they joined together. There was an order of magnitude between the demands and the identity being raised. The Egyptian revolution aimed to radically overthrow their government and so it required a large portion of the population. Accordingly, the articulated identity was simplified and all-encompassing. It invoked the ambiguous notion of “dignity” and called for undefined “democracy.” Looking back to Castells’ definition of a social movement, the Egyptian revolutions created an identity that could be understood both inside and outside the movement. While the nationalism and dignity were not identities that originated with the movement, the overarching identity of “Egyptians against Mubarak,” was created autonomously. Individuals within the movement were hidden by the unifying rhetoric. Nationalism and dignity were rallying cries to mobilize large swaths of the population, however they did not distinguish between the individual members. The Jan 25 movement created a totalizing identity, meant to oppose the monolithic, dominating force of Mubarak’s regime.

**The Structure of a Revolution**
The popular media as well as academics were particularly enamored with the networked structure of the Jan 25 movement (Diani 2011, Vargas 2012, Anderson 2011). There were two forms of networks: those mediated through communication technologies and those based in communities. Analysts disagree about the degree to which each affected the movement, but there instead of attempting to choose which was the prime instigator of the revolution, it is more fruitful to see how these seemingly inconsonant networks coalesced against Mubarak. Social media played a key role in mobilizing the people and creating a sense of security and unity, but it was not solely responsible for creating the networks of protest. Castells’ network society thesis, is therefore given more strength because it describes a structure of protest that exists independently of technological tools.
Srinivasan (2011) argues that despite the novelty of digital activism, preexisting, non-media networks were the more powerful narrative. These are familiar social groups, “[i]n Egypt, these networks may include family connections, neighborhoods, mosques and historical institutions such as the previously banned Muslim Brotherhood. New technologies hardly erode or overwhelm these classic models of communication and information sharing” Anderson (2011) adds to this point, saying that Egypt has culture of “deep communal bonds and trust,” which she believed allowed the movements to sustain their discipline, remain nonviolent and to organize without any centralized leadership (5). As a case in point, Anderson notes that when the police disengaged on orders from Mubarak in an attempt to create chaos, the citizens came together to maintain order.

Beyond cultural groups, more traditional social movement actors like political activists and labor unions played an important role. Members of aforementioned political organizations—The Muslim Brotherhood, Kefaya movement, April 6 movement and Ayman Nour’s party—all eventually joined, though some did with hesitation. The inclusion of these an established collective action organization gave the Jan 25 movement an air of legitimacy. Many of these groups did not use social media to organize but relied on their pre-established networks because, Khamis and Vaughn (2011) explain, many of the members were not Internet users and instead followed their preexisting “institutional traditions” which were partially fueled by fears of Internet surveillance (12). Traditional political actors were instrumental in sustaining the protests, contributing their experience and also garnering support from larger parts of the population.

Cultural and political networks are often overshadowed by the role of social media used by the aforementioned young, liberal middle class. Many have pointed out that communication technologies often aide social movements and social media is only the most recent incarnation of this phenomenon (Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 28; Cottle, 2011, 651). As Williamson (2011) explains, each medium performs a different role: “Alongside traditional activism and action, the tools of the trade today are the internet (for information dissemination and news), social media (to connect and coordinate), mobile phones (to capture what happens) and digital, particularly satellite, television to report it.” New social media allows the movements to circumvent censorship and the state-run media. Its rapid dissemination and ubiquity on mobile devices allowed protesters to quickly shift tactics (Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 12). However, Diani (2011) finds that social media’s most substantial impact was by strengthening ties of solidarity in dispersed middle class (3). Social media’s greatest contribution was not in convincing the population that Mubarak needed to leave, this was already an unspoken consensus. Rather, social media uncovered and connected potential dissidents in middle class Egyptian society and then facilitated communication with one another. Once that class was mobilized, social media gave the Jan 25 movement more flexibility to evade the regime. Castells noted that the network structure is more adept than hierarchies at responding and reforming rapidly according to changes in their environment. As the protests continued, this strength of the adaptability of networks became apparent.

The interplay between social media networks and physical protest networks is best highlighted when the regime cut the Internet for almost a week, beginning on January
28th, three days into the protests. Previously, as Cottle notes, social media also was used by the regime, from organizing pro-government rallies, creating dummy rallies in order to attract and then detain supporters, and even monitoring (Cottle, 2011 652). During the Internet black-out, activists used innovative analog technologies to communicate, using mobile phones, fax machines, dial-up modems, even ham radios (Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 14). Adel Iskander, an expert on Arab media, argues that the plan actually backfired because the Egyptian people’s ‘reaction was strong…they became more resilient and more determined, because they refused the government’s attempt to ‘infantilize’ them. Their message to the regime was ‘Egypt can’t be blocked and its people can’t be unplugged.’ “ (2011, qtd in Khamis and Vaughn 2011, 23). Rather than watching the protests unfold through their computer screens, people went to Tahrir Square, partially to protect from a massacre but also to protest. Even after the Internet was put back online, Tahrir Square became the epicenter of the movement. This moment demonstrated the limits of real virtuality and that in the Egyptian revolution the protest had to go beyond the screen to incorporate physical, social networks.

However, while real virtuality met its limits within Egypt, the broadcast of images of protest continued to hold importance in the rest of the world. One famous example during the Internet shutdown, Google and Twitter created “Speak-2-Tweet,” a service that allowed users to post and listen to Twitter messages for news. There was a reciprocal relationship between the protesters and the international community that Khamis and Vaughn describe, “Egyptian activists were supported by the flow of information coming to them from abroad, while simultaneously influencing international public opinion abroad” (15). The movement tapped into international networks to take advantage of resources beyond their borders. In this aspect real virtuality was key in strengthening bonds between international networks.

In Egypt, many networks overlapped to create a revolution against Mubarak. It extends from political groups, community organizations, Internet activists, street protesters and finally to an international community. They collectively identified as being against Mubarak, despite ideological differences. As Castells says, the main weakness of the network is the difficulty of coordinating towards a common goal, however, communication technology allows the network to be at once “centralized and decentralized. It can be co-ordinated without a center” (Stadler 2006, 185). While social media was initially used to organize the Jan 25 movement, the escalation of the protests during the Internet blackout demonstrates that the movement created a larger, more inclusive network of activists united against the regime.

**Evaluating the Network Society: the January 25th Movement**
The structural openings, oppositional identity and overlapping networks of the Jan 25 movement together demonstrate that Castells’ conception of a network society successfully describes the workings this particular social movement. The structural openings that created the Egyptian revolution can be summarily described as erosion in the regime’s legitimacy coupled with an increase in demands as well as empowerment of the population. In Egypt, the global financial crisis, failed economic liberalism and the dissemination of western values through the media contributed to popular discontent.
Additionally, the availability of technology to the mainly middle class segment of Egyptian society acted as an incubator for their dissatisfaction and later mobilization. During that period, an oppositional identity emerged that unified the Egyptian people under the banners of nationalism and dignity. This identity was powerful in earning the support of the masses, however it did obscure individual demands. This logic extends to the structure of the movement as well—networks from all parts of society joined together towards a common goal, ignoring internal differences. While Castells creates a framework that synthesizes how a network structure and oppositional identity form a social movement that takes advantage of structural openings to enact social change, it does not successfully explain the relationship between the object of protest and the role of the individual within the movement.

Castells’ shortcomings stem from an oversimplification of power. As previously explained, Castells uses a model of in/ex power that sees power as only the providence of members of networks. However, this fails to explain why the particular desires of an individual Egyptian protester are erased under a totalizing identity of being anti-Mubarak. The Jan 25 movement was composed of democrats, Islamists and radicals alike, each with very different conceptions of an ideal Egypt after Mubarak. However, these incompatible ideologies could be united to oppose Mubarak because their particular “logics” did not actually hold any power within their society. It means nothing to be a democrat or a political Islamist in an autocratic regime because both are dominated. Conversely, the network of the Jan 25 movement depends upon the existence of Mubarak for their own existence. The ex/in power that Castells describes is only capable of explaining how these disparate actors related to each other, but it does not look at how the overarching power structure compelled them to unite.

Power in Egypt came from one source—Mubarak’s regime. As Brumberg’s liberalized autocracy explains, any opposition that was allowed under Mubarak was used to create enough dissonance within society to cement the regime as the default, central, power-holder. Foucault would describe this relationship as domination because there was no possibility of resistance. Egyptians were not “free subjects” because they were incapable of resisting the regime in any meaningful way. Nash (2001) explains that “[p]ower is in operation wherever there are relations involving human beings with real alternative choices of action” (241). Since power is moving in only a downward direction, to challenge it, those that are dominated must collectively resist it in the opposite direction.

The totalizing identity and tactics of the Jan 25 movement were necessary to fully challenge the domination of the regime. As Foucault (1982) explains, both the domination of a group and the accompanying resistance and revolts are characterized by how they “manifest in a massive and universalizing form, at the level of a the whole social body, the locking together of power relations with relations of strategy and the results proceeding from their interactions” (795). The order of magnitude between the totalizing identity and an autocratic regime is not accidental, the Jan 25 movement needed to join together to create a unified block of resistance which would later create space for individual resistance. The aim of the Jan 25 movement was essentially to become free subjects. The in/ex power of Castells would only explain individual
participants aspirations as ways to gain power in an “alternate network” when the network of the Jan 25 movement is only a means to an end—freedom. While Castells elucidates the mechanics of a networked social movement, his analysis fails to recognize that the essential reason for the movement’s existence is freedom.

Case Study: Occupy Wall Street
OWS\(^3\) came into physical being in New York City’s Zuccotti Park on September 17\(^{th}\), when a thousand protesters congregated and three hundred set up a semi-permanent camp (Schwartz 2011). Two months later, the Occupy Movement spread to 826 cities in the United States, including both major metropolises and small rural towns, and had a presence in 352 cities across the globe (Saunders 2011). The Occupy movement came at the tail end of the other global protests, and the movement explicitly mirrored other movements. However this was a reciprocal form of contagion, while previous movements inspired the Occupy movement, it was the first one to spread its specific brand name to globally. OWS centered around two fundamental ideas: first, that the United States political economic system is broken; second, that another world is possible through a quasi-anarchist form of organization (Schwartz 2011). “Occupation” became shorthand for encampments of protesters, and their form became, in the words of Jones and Dean “a new form of political representation.” (2012, 1). Their slogan “We are the 99%” was the only unifying factor, the Occupy movement as a whole rejected the possibility of consolidating demands and instead let each individual encampment, even each individual protester, represent themselves. Through a study of the structural openings that allowed OWS to gain attention, the fragmented identities of the movement and finally diffuse network it employed, it will become clear that a fundamentally different power structure allowed this movement to develop.

Openings for Occupation
For their July issue, Adbusters magazine put together a simple poster of a ballerina atop the Wall Street bull with riot police in the background. There was only one line of text: #Occupy Wall Street. This image is typical of Adbusters— a subversive message, imagery of global revolution and a call to action. While the issues of political representation and economic injustice that galvanized the OWS movement cannot be underestimated, these economic and political realities were tools for preexisting group of the so-called Millenial activists. A radical faction of this generation were inspired by a political philosophy that rejected representation and attempted to make horizontalism a political form. With the help of sympathetic political thinkers and their congenital technology skills, these activists were able to orchestrate a full movement that spread beyond their ranks.

The common explanation of the Occupy movement holds social inequalities responsible for its creation. A Vanity Fair article reflected on the movement in February 2012, saying “[t]he amazing thing about Occupy Wall Street is not that it started—America was full of

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\(^3\) For the sake of clarity, I will use the term Occupy Wall Street to refer specifically to the New York City based movement, and the term Occupy movement to refer to the resulting global social movement.
fed-up people at the end of 2011—but that it worked” (Chafkin 2012, 74-75). By September 2011, the United States unemployment rate had hovered between 10 and 9% for two full years (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics). The Supreme Court’s unpopular Citizens United decision bestowed corporations with legal personhood, allowing undisclosed unlimited political campaign contributions. Finally, over the summer the United States Congress bickered over the nation’s budget leading to a near Treasury default. With all of these events together, the country was disenchanted with the relentless pursuit of profit. The sentiment was articulated in Joseph Stiglitz’s May 2011 Vanity Fair article “Of the 1%, by the 1%, for the 1%” examined economic stratification and the undue influence elites exert over the political process. This article is rumored to be the root of the slogan “We are the 99%.” However, this narrative of OWS as a product of social frustration overlooks the movement’s innovative form of protest and the extent to which it is consciously created by a new generation of activists.

The Millenial generation’s form of activism is highly personalized, technology-dependent and located within the world of real virtuality. Kristin Ivie, from the progressive website Social Citizens, explains that the generation balances between two extremes—effective activism 2.0 and “slackavism” (2009). Activism 2.0 shifts social change from large-scale one-time campaigns to making it a daily exercise through “small, practical acts - and, often, clicks” (Ivie 2009). “Slackavism,” on the other hand, was coined by Evgeny Morozov, a vocal skeptic of digital democracy, to describe “feel-good online activism that has zero political or social impact,” citing online petitions and “liking” a cause on Facebook. He questions whether the organizational effort put into such campaigns could be better spent using more conventional methods of activism (Morozov 2009). Micah White, chief editor of Adbusters, wrote an opinion piece in The Guardian in 2010 denouncing “clicktivism” and instead called for digital activists to “jettison the consumerist ideology of marketing that has for too long constrained the possibility of social revolution” (White 2010). Millenial activists engage in the process of producing culture through real virtuality by creating turning causes into symbols, whether it be a page on Facebook, a Youtube video or a Kickstarter campaign, with the intention of raising funds and awareness. However, their critics question whether these tactics can truly create social change. In both their effective and unsuccessful incarnations, the Millenial activists disseminate their causes through communication technology with a focus on individual participation.

The mobilization of Millenial activists into a large, sustained protest was inspired by the protests that erupted across the globe against seemingly similar forces of oppression and successful oppositional tactics. The Indignados movement in Spain camped in over 60 public squares calling for economic democracy, political justice and peace. Jeffery Sach, an economics professor publically speculated, “[d]on’t be so sure it can’t happen here. Because the precursors—of inequality, a sense of injustice—apply to the U.S.” (Chafkin 2012, 75). Just as contagion affected the Middle East, America activists felt that it was their moment to do something. Exactly what they did was informed by a growing adherence among activists to a philosophy of protest that employs local networks to empower individual action rather than create a unified representative body.
Dean and Jones (2012) describe the theory that drives the Occupy movement, deeming it a new form of political participation that empowers the individual. Jones and Dean explain that representation is seen as “unavoidably hierarchical, distancing and repressive” qualities that are antithetical to the movement. They cite Hardt and Negri, who explain that representation is not fighting for inclusion in traditional avenues of political participation and instead are building their own form of representation (2). David Graeber, a British anthropologist who was instrumental in shaping Occupy’s anarchist decision-making body, highlights the importance of prefigurative politics in which protesters attempt to create the world as they hope it to be (2). Finally, OWS rejects representation of others, which Dean and Jones explain is includes both representation within group decisions and collectively representing the movement: “To speak for another, it is claimed, effects a kind of violence or exclusion, repressing individual autonomy…[and] any attempt to represent the movement would necessarily restrict, judge and negate it, reducing its potential to the already given terms and expectations of the dominant system” (2). This philosophy becomes the basis for the vehement horizontalism structure of the movement, which is complementary to the highly individualized tactics of the Millenial generation.

The main structural openings that enabled OWS mirror those that empower the Jan 25 movement—the simultaneous crumbling of institutions and the rise of a new group of activists—yet the details speak to the fact that the United States has a long tradition of competitive, participatory democracy. The United States, despite some radicals’ claims to the contrary, is not a liberalized autocracy. The economic and political crisis greatly exacerbated preexisting inequalities in the United States, however individuals within the movement did have established paths of recourse in the political system. As for the Millenial generation of activists, they differ from earlier protesters because their social change is enacted on a symbolic yet highly individualized level mainly taking place in the sphere of real virtuality. This type of activism is only possible with the free flow of information without undue censorship. In this environment, a philosophy of protest that rejects representation and expresses its beliefs through action is a form of resisting the status quo of a representative democracy.

Creating an Oppositional Identity of the 99%
A week and a half into the setting up camp in Zuccotti Park, the General Assembly of New York City released the “Declaration of the Occupation,” a long unwieldy list of demands blaming corporations for almost every social and economic ill in America. It ended with their solution: “Exercise your right to peaceably assemble; occupy public space; create a process to address the problems we face; and generate solutions accessible to everyone” (Schwartz 2011). The movement as a whole did not adopt these nor any other list of demands, however they did use the New York Assembly’s solution. By not codifying demands, OWS is able to encompass every individual identity. Members were galvanized by the way the movement opposed elites with their slogan “We are the 99%,” but even this phrase was used to distinguish each individual’s story. The identity did not oppose a single entity but instead the Occupy movement denounced the American capitalist and democratic system.
The one unifying slogan of OWS is the phrase “We are the 99%.” It creates an identity that is once all-inclusive but also deeply individual. The digital Tumblr “We are the 99%” is an aggregation of people’s stories of economic mishaps and social disenfranchisement. The format is the same: a self-portrait of a person with their face hidden behind a handwritten or typed sheet of paper telling their story. The effect is almost overwhelming as the viewer sees endless, yet unique permutations of dispossession. The slogan in itself, however, implies the membership of almost every person in the world. It is a far cry from “Down with Mubarak,” because it doesn’t name a common enemy instead it asserts the membership of all. In this use, real virtuality can subvert overarching systems because by articulating their stories in a mediated reality, the powerless becoming empowered. “We are the 99%” brings attention to the various ways the entire political economic system acts oppressively.

The refusal to tabulate demands allows the Occupy movement to fully resist oppressive institutions and instead transfer attention to action. In an interview, Graeber explained not having demands avoided cooption by the institutions that cause the systematic problems, “it’s a way of juxtaposing yourself against these powerful, undemocratic forces you’re protesting. If you make demands, you’re saying, in a way, that you’re asking the people in power and the existing institutions to do something different” (Klein 2011). Instead, OWS proved to their participants that it is possible to function outside of the oppressive system. As Stoller observed, the camps offer as a “church of dissent…a group of people, gathered together, to create a public space seeking meaning in their culture…There’s a deep fear of official spokespeople beginning to monopolize and misinterpret the non-hierarchical model of community protest” (Stoller 2011). By rejecting demands and instead focusing on action, the movement created an identity that opposed institutions and relied on individual’s creation of meaning.

OWS’s identity was defined by what it was not—the 1%. This is all-inclusive but also a completely negative construction of identity. Instead of relying on a common, articulated group of demands, the movement defined its own meaning through action. The choice to not have demands was intentional, another of Castells’ hallmarks for social movements. In a sense, OWS’s identity was formed in the realm of theory and then put into practice. The anti-representation philosophy means no overall identity exists; each individual group, even individual participant, prioritizes his or her own demands. The construction of identity in OWS is fluid to the extreme giving individuals equal power in the organization. The movement forced itself to be interpreted through its action rather than attempt to create a totalizing identity. Resistance for OWS is highly individualized, just as oppression from the larger political economic system is an individual experience.

The Structure of the Occupy Movement
The structure of OWS exemplifies the dynamic between the individual and overall movement. In Zuccotti Park, decision-making was done by the General Assembly, which Schneider succinctly describes: “[g]et ready for jargon: the General Assembly is a horizontal, autonomous, leaderless, modified-consensus-based system with roots in anarchist thought” (2011). There are no hierarchies of decision-making. Each individual, theoretically, has the same amount of power as the others. From its macro-organization to
the structure within specific encampments, the movement deliberately operates as a spread-out network to create a new political form.

The operation of individual encampments demonstrates the extent and limits of anti-representational horizontalism as a political form. Each OWS group makes decisions through the General Assembly (GA), an open congregation of every participant, which operates according to the principle that every individual has equal power and no one person may represent another. To communicate in large groups, protesters used a “people’s mike” system creating a rippling echo to amplify the individual speakers (Schwartz 2011). As Schwartz (2011) explains, “In the same way that poker ritualizes capitalism and North Korea’s mass games ritualize totalitarianism, the people’s mike ritualizes horizontalism” (2011). Any individual may make a proposal but any other person may “block” it if they disagree with it so fundamentally that if it passed they would leave the group. A block requires the person who proposed the measure to defend it again and the measure will only be passed if 90 percent of the GA decides to allow it. This gives an inordinate amount of power to the radical fringes of the movement while preserving the integrity of the movement’s principles. However, in practice some of these ideals are upset. For example, The New Yorker reported that Marisa Holmes is an unofficial leader of the New York GA. She proposed instituting a Spokes Council with limited day-to-day authority which eventually was approved after much debate (Schwartz 2011). As with any political form, horizontalism encounters its limits when put into practice.

In most Occupy Encampments, working groups partially act as public utilities services and as voices for the movement—health, food, legal, sanitation and public relations are common groups in encampments. In New York City alone, however, there are 89 working groups, which range from the practical to radical to recreational, including Alternative Currencies (171 members), Occupy Farms (109 members), Meditation (150 members), Translation (92 members), Immigrant Worker Justice (70 members) and Medics (110 members) (“New York General Assembly, #Occupy Wall Street”). Each of these groups has an online presence, but it is unclear how many are active as of May 2012. The proliferation and diversity of working groups demonstrates the degree of agency individuals are given within OWS, anyone with initiative may create their own working group.

Beyond the structure of individual movements, technology plays a key role in allowing the movements to coordinate with each other and share tactics. The hashtag #OCCUPYWALLSTREET was first used by Adbusters’ iconic poster in August, but lay dormant until the protesters took to Zuccotti Park. Trendistic, a company which tracks hashtags on Twitter, found that in the twenty-four hours after the first occupation, the movement was nearly one of every five hundred hash tags, a statistic that remained true a month later (Berkowitz 2011). The movement also created its own centers of communication. The live-streaming video website Global Revolution was established on September 17th and continues to act as a documentarian and newscaster of the Occupy movements across the globe. Occupy actively creates their own symbols within the culture of real virtuality using social media and other Internet tools. As Castells suggests,
technology enables the network’s flexibility by letting the groups communicate with each other. Schwartz observes this is part of a zeitgeist, “horizontalism seems made for this moment. It relies on people forming loose connections quickly—something that modern technology excels at” (2011). Social media brought together activists together, creating international networks that abscissed to the Occupy identity.

Including creating publicity about the movement, there is a dizzying amount of websites that act as instruction manuals: OccupyWallStreet.com, OccupyWallStreet.org, TakeTheSquare.net, Adbusters’ Occupy website, as well as the Facebook pages for each individual city. Their “How To” sections usually link to HowToOccupy.org, a free, open database to “promote and spread the methods, techniques and knowledge about peaceful occupation of public spaces while living based upon participatory democracy.” It includes sections on camping, cooking, first aid, non-violent demonstration, legal resources, communication and squatting. The largest section is “Building a New World,” where groups with self-explanatory names such as “Wikiparliament,” “Basic Income Earth Network,” “Seeds for Change” and “Open Library” are given short blurbs and links to their sites. The website serves as both as a clearinghouse for alternative ways of life but also as a tutorial for protest. The movement spread globally through the Internet, but with the intention of empowering people internationally to take part in real-world activism.

For OWS, the network structure was not chosen to escape censorship but instead as a political act. Networks formed around ideas, such as the working groups, rather than out of necessity or accident as with the Jan 25 movement. Furthermore, while individual networks were all interrelated, they were not united under a totalizing demand. Instead, the network was a form of prefigurative politics as it equalized power between each member of OWS throughout the decision-making process. The online Occupy movement also forged networks through social media with the intention of creating physical manifestations of their particular philosophy across the globe. In both the macro- and micro- structure of Occupy, the network is a deliberate, political structure that aims to empower the individual.

**Evaluating the Network Society: Occupy Wall Street**

As with the Jan 25 movement, Castells’ network society thesis explains the mechanics of the OWS movement as a decentralized movement articulating an oppositional identity. The movement was born out of a crisis of the political and economic institutions, which Occupy broadly condemned, citing vast inequalities in America, the corruption within the political system and a general disapprobation of the judicial system. Furthermore, the Millenial generation were poised to use real virtuality as platform to spread the message of discontent. International revolutionaries served as inspiration that a leaderless movement was a sustainable form of protest. An anti-representational philosophy influenced the movement to create a new horizontal form of political participation. This translated into an outright rejection of demands which allowed each individual protester to express their own grievances. “The 99%” took on as many meanings as there were individuals to articulate them, an extreme example of Castells’ idea that a single movement can articulate many meanings, depending upon audience. Absent of stated
demands, the movement’s actions became their message. The structure of each encampment further empowered the individual by equalizing decision-making power among every participant. Each camp became a microcosm of an alternative world made up of working groups and General Assemblies. In Castells’ framework, OWS is a social movement that intentionally challenges the political-economy by expressing a broad oppositional identity through a politicized network structure.

This synopsis, however, fails to explain a key difference between OWS and the Jan 25 movement that stem from their distinct overarching relations of power. The individual protester in OWS represents himself or herself autonomously, there is no totalizing identity like the anti-Mubarak identity. The only overarching identity of the Occupy movement is opposition to the political economic system seen as oppressing them, there is no specified demand. Foucault explains that to be subjugated one must at once be controlled by another but also be aware of one’s own identity. The OWS protesters were no doubt “free subjects” according to Foucault—their self-representation of their grievances attest to that fact. Domination is unilateral control, while power can only be exercised on free subject capable of resisting such as the OWS protester.

Subjugation is a complex power structure that allows some resistance. Power does not flow downwards, as it does under a dictatorship, instead subjugation can happen simultaneously at different levels. Familiar forms of subjugation include racism, sexism and classism. Each individual simultaneously experiences privileges or restrictions depending on how they are perceived by others. OWS individualized attempting to encompass every variation of oppression. By refusing to name their demands Occupy indicted the system at large allowing resistance to flow in all directions. The prefigurative politics of the OWS movement is actually a form of liberation from subjugation. The fragmented identity and politicized network were both ways to directly challenge the political economic system that controlled the people. The network structure acted as a “relation of strategy” because by incorporating all individuals without favoring one over another it acted as the converse to a political economic system that subjugated everyone except the elites. Whereas the Jan 25 movement’s essential aim was to achieve freedom and gain the possibility of resistance, the OWS movement was attempting to create a new way to resist that subverts the oppressive political economic system.

Conclusions: Power in a Network Society
Manuel Castells’ theory of the network society make intelligible a wide-array of disparate phenomena that can include a global economic crisis, Facebook revolutions and leaderless encampments of politically minded squatters, quite an accomplishment for a triology that was published in 1998. His theory elucidates the specific operation of the network as a political, social, economic and cultural form. He explains how information technology has contributed to a world in which individuals may be coordinated without a central decision-maker or hierarchy. The network becomes a superior form of organization because it is flexible, adaptable and capable of endless expansion. His conception of space and time as being a “space of flows” and “timeless time,” describes the accelerated yet fragmented rhythms of life and the ethereal nature of power no longer bound by geography. Power is binary; one is either included or excluded, determining
relations of power according to each network’s particular logic. Within this increasingly discordant world, social movements are seen as the only source of social change.

As the world shifts to a social morphology of the network, institutions are put into crisis, creating many of the structural openings that surrounded both OWS and the Jan 25 movement, manifested in diverse events such as the global financial crisis, rising inequality in the United States and the infiltration of democracy in autocratic states. “Real virtuality,” in which reality is a mediated experience that exists on the screens, becomes the principle source of meaning. Activists in both Egypt and the United States took a hold of this new space to establish a virtual civil society free of censorship in order to express subversive ideas that spread globally along channels of social and mass media. The two movements expressed latent oppositional identities that denounced each movement’s respective political-economic system. These identities were reified in the movements’ “decentralized,” “horizontal,” and simply put, “leaderless” structure. As applied to the two case studies, Castells’ theory explains the workings of a networked social movement while contextualizing it in a larger theory of a changing social structure.

Despite Castells’ successes in describing both the structural openings as well as the advantages of using a network, his conception of power simplifies the role of the overarching power structure on the formation of movements’ identity. Identity in social movements, as previously stated, is a recursive interaction between the individual participant who ascribes to that identity as well as the object of contention, which prompts the creation of that identity. In the case of the Jan 25 movement, Egyptian citizens associated themselves with nationalism and dignity, but they were compelled to exert that identity to coalesce against Mubarak’s despotic regime. Similarly, the OWS participants united under the “We are the 99%” banner because they felt oppressed by the political-economic system. However, the object of contention in Egypt and OWS were categorically different. Egypt under Mubarak was an autocratic society completely dominated its citizens. In comparison, the OWS protesters as citizens in a competitive democracy were “free subjects” capable of resistance. Their protest was not against being dominated, but instead an attempt to create a new form of political participation.

This observation has ramifications in the function of the network in the two movements. In Egypt, the network was a means to an end—democracy. In contrast, OWS’s network became politicized. The General Assembly and the encampments were a form of prefigurative politics that suggested anti-representational, horizontal political participation was not only ideal but also a viable possibility. Foucault explains that “relations of strategy” change depending on the type of power relations so that there is a degree of similarity in the way power is exerted but also resisted. The network that the Jan 25 movement used was composed of all facets of Egyptian society and directed toward a dominating force. OWS was also an all-inclusive network, however by rejecting any representation, the resistance took on a diasporic, individualized form mirroring diffuse systemic oppression.

At the time of this writing in May 2012, both of these movements are still developing—Egypt will soon hold presidential elections and OWS just mounted their May 1st
resurgence campaign. As the movements progress, Castells and Foucault can be instrumental in guiding questions for further inquiry to fully understand the interplay between power and networks. What is the true potential of the network as a political form? In Egypt, will the networked revolution prove capable of changing an autocratic regime to a fully democratic one? Or, will a new dictator simply replace Mubarak in these upcoming elections? In the greater Occupy movement, can a politicized network be a viable alternative to the larger political economic system? Have the protesters discovered a successful “relation of strategy” to oppose the subjugation of the American capitalist democratic system? The answers to these questions will enrich our understanding of methods of resistance in shifting political economic systems.