Title

When Moral Hazard Is Good: A Critique Of The United States Health Insurance System

Abstract

Health plays an immensely significant role in an individual's life; it can determine both the quality and the length of a person's existence. It is therefore no surprise that health care is such a prevalent and controversial topic in the world today. In contrast to the historically public and non-exclusive health insurance in Europe, the health care system in the United States is exclusive and relies heavily on the private market for financing (Geyman 2005). This American preference toward consumers-directed health care is explained by the controversial "moral hazard" theory of health insurance. According to this theory, full insurance encourages individuals to overuse health services because they appear "free" or highly subsidized. New theory, however, indicates that this dominant view of moral hazard is fundamentally flawed, that full insurance is in fact effective and efficient.

Date of Completion

Spring 2006

Degree Type

Thesis

Format

PDF

URI

http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/15

Language

English

Department

Economics