Abstract
There are many incentives for physicians to dual practice such as an increase in salary, technology usage, or less work hours. By using the New Institutional Economic approach, we examine these incentives of physicians in Canada's health care system in three scenarios of dual practice. In the first scenario is physicians dual practicing without any government policies or restrictions in the private sector. In the second scenario, physicians are not to allow to dual practice, meaning a full out ban of dual practicing. In the third and final tier, restrictions or government policies will be place in the private sector while still allowing physicians to dual practice. This paper analyzes which of the three scenarios best benefit social welfare in Canada's health care system by examining the incentives of physicians to dual practice.
Date of Completion
12-18-2007
Degree Type
Thesis
Format
URI
http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/44
Language
English
Rights
Department
Economics
Recommended Citation
Chue, Pholeng, "Incentives to Dual Practice New Institutional Economic analysis of Canada’s mixed public-private health sector" (2007). Economics Theses. 44.
https://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/44