Title

The Cost Of Forfeiting Causal Inheritance

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

9-1-2013

Publication Title

Philosophical Studies

Department

Philosophy

Abstract

Jaegwon Kim's causal inheritance principle says that the causal powers of a mental property instance are identical with the causal powers of its particular physical realizer. Sydney Shoemaker's subset account of realization is at odds with Kim's principle: it says that a mental property instance has fewer causal powers than Kim's principle entails. In this paper, I argue that the subset account should be rejected because it has intolerable consequences for mental causation, consequences that are avoided by accepting causal inheritance. I develop my argument in part by drawing on one of the central debates that has arisen regarding the extended mind hypothesis defended by Andy Clark and David Chalmers.

Volume

165

Issue

2

pp.

491-507

ISSN

0031-8116