Title

Disproportional Mental Causation

Document Type

Article

Publication Date

10-2011

Publication Title

Synthese

Department

Philosophy

Abstract

In this paper I do three things. First, I argue that Stephen Yablo’s influential account of mental causation is susceptible to counterexamples involving what I call disproportional mental causation. Second, I argue that similar counterexamples can be generated for any alternative account of mental causation that is like Yablo’s in that it takes mental states and their physical realizers to causally compete. Third, I show that there are alternative nonreductive approaches to mental causation which reject the idea of causal competition, and which thus are able to allow for disproportional mental causation. This, I argue, is a significant advantage for such noncompetitive accounts.

Volume

182

Issue

3

pp.

375-391

ISSN

0039-7857