Location

Murray Boardroom, University of Puget Sound

Event Website

http://webspace.pugetsound.edu/facultypages/atubert/ConferenceSchedule2016.htm

Start Date

12-2-2016 3:00 PM

End Date

12-2-2016 3:50 PM

Description

Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions played a significant role in the development of philosophy of language. However, the shift from semantics to pragmatics in the narrative of language philosophy seemed to leave Russell’s theory in the past as an important but obsolete stepping stone. There is a chance that Russell may have been dismissed too casually, and if so, the grounds on which his theory is rejected must be carefully re-evaluated. In this paper I examine two problems with Russell’s theory that extend beyond the most well-known direct criticisms. In particular, I investigate problems with Russell’s approach to egocentricity as well as his treatment of descriptions of fictional subjects. I then proceed to explore the high-level implications of these problems.

Type

event

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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Feb 12th, 3:00 PM Feb 12th, 3:50 PM

Revisiting Russell's Theory of Descriptions

Murray Boardroom, University of Puget Sound

Bertrand Russell’s theory of definite descriptions played a significant role in the development of philosophy of language. However, the shift from semantics to pragmatics in the narrative of language philosophy seemed to leave Russell’s theory in the past as an important but obsolete stepping stone. There is a chance that Russell may have been dismissed too casually, and if so, the grounds on which his theory is rejected must be carefully re-evaluated. In this paper I examine two problems with Russell’s theory that extend beyond the most well-known direct criticisms. In particular, I investigate problems with Russell’s approach to egocentricity as well as his treatment of descriptions of fictional subjects. I then proceed to explore the high-level implications of these problems.

http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/psupc/psupc2016/Friday/4