Location

Murray Boardroom, University of Puget Sound

Event Website

http://webspace.pugetsound.edu/facultypages/atubert/ConferenceSchedule2016.htm

Start Date

13-2-2016 12:00 PM

End Date

13-2-2016 12:50 PM

Description

By virtue of Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë’s enactive sensorimotor contingency theory, and its central tenets- perception is constituted by mastery of occurrent sensorimotor contingencies used for thought and action-guidance- the theory suggests the resolution of the explanatory gap problem and provides arguments to dismantle representationalist research programs. Central objections to O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory are addressed: (1) synaesthetic visual color-perception and the problem of non-identical ratios of qualitative experience from peripheral inputs (2) sensorimotor contingency theory implies propositional knowledge- consequently perceptual consciousness is state-based. Temporal coupling shows synaesthesia does not have to be constituted by isomorphic input-output mappings for perceptual consciousness. Objection (2), for radical enactivism lacks epistemological implications for both enactive cognition and future research in perceptual consciousness. Epistemological implications of the sensorimotor contingency theory are addressed through Varela, et al.’s embodied cognition and mindfulness theory which demonstrates pragmatic value for a sensorimotor contingency theory.

Type

event

Included in

Philosophy Commons

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Feb 13th, 12:00 PM Feb 13th, 12:50 PM

Empirical and Epistemological Implications of an Enactive Sensorimotor Contingency Theory

Murray Boardroom, University of Puget Sound

By virtue of Kevin O’Regan and Alva Noë’s enactive sensorimotor contingency theory, and its central tenets- perception is constituted by mastery of occurrent sensorimotor contingencies used for thought and action-guidance- the theory suggests the resolution of the explanatory gap problem and provides arguments to dismantle representationalist research programs. Central objections to O’Regan and Noë’s sensorimotor contingency theory are addressed: (1) synaesthetic visual color-perception and the problem of non-identical ratios of qualitative experience from peripheral inputs (2) sensorimotor contingency theory implies propositional knowledge- consequently perceptual consciousness is state-based. Temporal coupling shows synaesthesia does not have to be constituted by isomorphic input-output mappings for perceptual consciousness. Objection (2), for radical enactivism lacks epistemological implications for both enactive cognition and future research in perceptual consciousness. Epistemological implications of the sensorimotor contingency theory are addressed through Varela, et al.’s embodied cognition and mindfulness theory which demonstrates pragmatic value for a sensorimotor contingency theory.

http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/psupc/psupc2016/Saturday/1