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# Disorder in Rome's Asia Minor

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## Introduction

During the Early Roman Empire in Asia Minor, the setting for this case study, actors in Rome (usually the emperor or the senate) and proconsuls, provincial governors stationed within the provinces, worked together to serve Roman interests.<sup>1</sup> In this study, I will examine the ways in which the provinces in Asia Minor posed a great challenge to the following Roman interests: I. the enforcement of Roman and local law; II. the preservation of political stability; III. the maintenance of provincial infrastructure and finances. This case study will provide a greater understanding of the challenges that arose in governing Roman provinces.

In order to evaluate the Anatolian provinces, I will use as evidence the *Epistulae*, letters, of Pliny the Younger and the *Discourses*, which are mostly orations, of Dio Chrysostom. Pliny's letters provide the perspective of Roman governors, while Dio's orations reveal the circumstances of urban Greeks and city politics. These sources also, however valuable, have their limitations as their authors have motivations for writing their works in addition to simply providing information. Pliny is motivated to present himself as an ideal governor, while Dio speaks of abstract philosophical concepts more than mundane realities. Therefore, it is prudent to proceed with caution and skepticism when analyzing these works.

## Political Context

An introduction to the framework for Roman governance and the political situation in Asia Minor will aid in the understanding of this study. As Andrew Lintott expertly puts it, "in the Greek world the Roman aim was, first, to ensure that the cities obeyed any general rules laid down for the province, whether in an all-embracing *lex provinciae* or on separate occasions" and "to apply through proconsular authority both laws that the Romans applied to themselves ... and

other regulations devised by emperors or the senate for the provinces.”<sup>2</sup> By 27 BCE, at least, Roman provinces were divided between the senate and the emperor. Generally, if a province was peaceful and housed few troops, the senate appointed the governor, but if a province was threatened and home to large numbers of troops, the emperor controlled the province himself or appointed a proconsul.<sup>3</sup> These appointed proconsuls had great freedom in governing their provinces, but they were answerable to and subject to instructions from the emperor and the senate.<sup>4</sup> Such communication as Pliny’s letters to and from Trajan, sent between Bithynia et Pontus and Rome, allowed for Rome’s political center to remain active in controlling persons and resources, gathering and processing information, and keeping records of decisions made in the provinces.<sup>5</sup>

But just as Romans were active in provincial administrations, the Greeks themselves were mostly self-governing. In order that the task of governing the province was not unmanageable for a proconsul and his staff, Rome “maintained the [Greek] *poleis* within a wide-reaching framework under a unified administration,” made use of local government, and encouraged its development.<sup>6</sup> The existing city governments generally had annual magistrates, the most notable being the office of *archôn*, one or more city councils (*boulês*), which probably possessed a membership around 300 and 400 members in larger cities, and an assembly (*ekklêsia*). The office of *archôn* was the highest within the city held by a small number of men, with a leading or senior *archôn* in charge. He presided over the *boulê* and the *ekklêsia* and was the most visible leading figure in the city. The legal enactments of Greek cities required approval from both the *boulê* and the *ekklêsia*, though sometimes the latter’s purpose was simply to ratify the proposals prepared by the *boulê*.<sup>7</sup> Because the *boulê* had property requirements for

membership and because, in some cities, new members were required to pay a fee upon entry, it is likely that politics in these cities were dominated by an elite inner circle.<sup>8</sup>

### **Source: Pliny the Younger**

A short overview of Pliny the Younger's life, his position as governor of Bithynia et Pontus, and his collection of letters as a source will aid in the understanding of this study. Pliny was born in CE 61 or 62 and was educated in Rome. His uncle, the Elder Pliny, died in the eruption of Vesuvius and left his estate to his adopted nephew, who took the name Gaius Plinius Luci filius Caecilius Secundus. He followed the *cursus honorum*, serving, among other public duties, as a treasurer and a lawyer. He was eventually appointed by Emperor Trajan to be a proconsul in Bithynia et Pontus, where he probably died around 113 CE.<sup>9</sup>

Pliny's term as proconsul began in 111 CE and because a successor in Bithynia et Pontus is not recorded until 113-114, the exact termination of Pliny's term as proconsul is unknown, though many scholars believe that Pliny died while in office.<sup>10</sup> Before Trajan, Bithynia et Pontus was a public province governed by proconsuls of praetorian rank. The senate passed a decree under Trajan, converting the province into an imperial province, administered by a *legatus Augusti pro praetore*. Pliny was sent as such a *legatus*, with proconsular power.<sup>11</sup> As governor, Pliny spent the majority of his time addressing the affairs of cities and prominent individuals within the province, as was the practice of most provincial governors, who had time only to visit more populous areas.<sup>12</sup> Pliny was not only stationed in his province in order to act in a regular legal capacity, by upholding existing laws, hearing cases, ensuring Roman and provincial security, and collecting taxes, for example, but also to report regularly to Trajan, who showed a

keen interest in Bithynia et Pontus, only objecting twice to Pliny's decision to trouble him with trivial issues.<sup>13</sup>

Trajan's interest in the province manifested itself in special *mandata*, commands, that he issued to Pliny before his departure that he would have to observe while in office. These *mandata* were issued to address concerns specific to Bithynia et Pontus at this time. According to Sherwin-White, Pliny assumed "the role of *curator* for *all* the cities" of the province.<sup>14</sup> That is, Pliny was sent to address financial wastefulness, mostly as a result of extravagant public building projects.<sup>15</sup> In order to explain why Pliny rarely consulted Trajan about city finances themselves, Sherwin-White concludes that "in this sphere Pliny was a master." He goes on to explain that Pliny "had spent four or five years at the head of the Roman treasuries and needed no guidance."<sup>16</sup> However, according to Woolf, that Pliny was sent to his province with special financial responsibilities is "not really testable" since Pliny devotes special attention alongside municipal finances to building projects, the military, and the imperial cult.<sup>17</sup> That Pliny devotes special attention to other issues, including the ban on social and political clubs,<sup>18</sup> which themselves most likely other *mandata*, is certainly true. However, a majority of scholars do agree that Pliny's primary *mandatum* concerned correcting city finances in his province.<sup>19</sup> Additionally, two letters from Trajan himself speak of a "special mission" involving the inspection of city finances.<sup>20</sup> Because *mandata* were designed to limit the *imperium* of a proconsul, questions of interpretation often required communication with the emperor, often in the form of letters such as Pliny's.<sup>21</sup> Overall, these *mandata* are very useful for revealing the Romans' chief concerns within the province.

The *Epistulae* of Pliny afford modern readers a detailed look at provincial administration, but there remains some doubt concerning the authenticity of the letters. In Pliny's letters to

Trajan, he attempts to present himself as a thoughtful governor and a personal friend of Trajan, while Trajan in his letters to Pliny presents himself as a *civilis princeps* who concerns himself with justice, the well-being of Romans and provincials, and healthy relationships with his subordinates.<sup>22</sup>

### **Source: Dio Chrysostom**

A short overview of Dio Chrysostom's life, his political and social standing, and his collection of orations as a source will aid in the understanding of this study. Dio Cocceianus Chrysostomus, as he is now known to historians, was born a citizen of Prusa, a city in Bithynia et Pontus ca. 40 CE.<sup>23</sup> His maternal grandfather, and therefore his mother as well, was a Roman citizen and he was also a generous benefactor of Prusa.<sup>24</sup> Bekker-Nielsen speculates that Dio's mother married below her own status, since Dio's father was a *peregrinus* and passed on that status to his son.<sup>25</sup> We know little of Dio's father, but Bekker-Nielsen speculates that Dio's father was a moneylender who offered loans without security at high interest rates because of Dio's reference to his father's large, but small in value, fortune.<sup>26</sup>

At any rate, Dio was still a member of the local elite and held property of notable value. For example, he possessed vineyards, cattle, a house in the city, and workshops which he rented out.<sup>27</sup> In his early adult life, Dio held political offices in his city, until he had the opportunity to journey to Rome, where he enjoyed exposure to the Roman elite. During the reign of Domitian, Dio was sent into exile from Rome and from his native city due to his friendship with one of Domitian's enemies. During the period of his exile, he assumed the role of a philosopher and traveled extensively about the empire, delivering orations to various cities, their assemblies, and their councils. In December of 96, upon Domitian's death, Dio's exile was ended by Emperor

Nerva, from whom Dio inherited the name Cocceianus, and he received a warm welcome in his native city of Prusa.<sup>28</sup> However, Dio had lost his political capital during his exile and his estate had fallen into ruin.<sup>29</sup> Although Dio chose not to participate officially in the political affairs of Prusa, he would for the rest of his life act as a political advisor with reasonable sway over the city's *boulê* and *ekklêsia*. Following in his father's footsteps, Dio's son eventually won a place on the *boulê* and possibly became an *archôn*.<sup>30</sup> However, Dio's last years were not happy, with the loss of his son who had showed promise in his political career, and the loss of his wife.<sup>31</sup>

Although Dio held no office after his exile, even refusing his city's wish to make him *archôn*, his fame was widely celebrated within and without Prusa. Dio often claims intimate friendship with the emperor, both during the reign of Nerva and the reign of Trajan.<sup>32</sup> He also speaks of his friendship with "many others who may be called the most influential among the Romans."<sup>33</sup> Although this claim may have been meant to bolster his position in Prusa, many of his listeners believed him.<sup>34</sup> Furthermore it is certainly possible that Dio had known Nerva before his exile. Additionally, Dio did meet Emperor Trajan and addressed four orations to him. Trajan likely found interest in accommodating Dio, since showing kindness to a victim of Domitian would help him distance his reign from Domitian's.<sup>35</sup> Dio also boasts his prestige among Greek cities, those that "vied to have him as counselor." Indeed, as Salmeri put it, "with the reputation he had gained for oratorical skills and, above all, sound wisdom, he was much sought after" and Dio "considered no Greek city foreign to his competence."<sup>36</sup>

On the other hand, Dio's fame also earned him many enemies. Bekker-Nielsen speculates that Dio was a social climber who would have been held in contempt by those already at the top, and would have been demonized by his some of his fellow Prusans for father's practice of money-lending.<sup>37</sup> Throughout his political orations, Dio is forced to defend himself from many

charges, including lying about friendship with the emperor, mishandling Prusa's embassy to Rome, conspiring with a Roman proconsul, filling seats in the *boulê* with his own men, and taking other tyrannical and demagogical actions.<sup>38</sup> In addition to Dio's reputation, his ability to complete his public building projects was also threatened by his opponents, members of Prusa's political and social elite.<sup>39</sup> Bekker-Nielsen speculates that Dio's opponents were put off by Dio's success in convincing Trajan to allow the addition of members to the *boulê*, since new members, because they would be recruited from the top down, would be drawn from a lower class.<sup>40</sup> The social elite in Prusa saw Dio as a threat to their positions.

Dio's *Discourses* provide a detailed look into urban life in Greek cities. Bekker-Nielsen believes that Dio's orations survive as they were reconstructed from his speaking notes. He also suggests that Dio regularly did not write his speeches out and would have reason not to do so in addresses to the *boulê*, since "Dio was unable to foresee which course they day's discussion would take." In the *ekklêsia*, Bekker-Nielsen speculates that Dio would rely upon a partially-written speech with practiced themes, leaving parts to be improvised.<sup>41</sup> In addition to the fragmentary nature of some of his orations, Dio's personal interests threaten the authenticity of his orations. Bekker-Nielsen observes that prior to his exile, Dio identified with the local elite in Prusa, but after his exile and his turn toward philosophy, he avoided holding a formal office in politics and instead took on the role of a "philosopher-advisor." Bekker-Nielsen speculates that this change was spawned by exposure to Roman high society, which had little interest in the high offices of provincial cities that Dio had previously held in the high regard. Thus, after his exile, the political prestige to be found in Prusa seemed insubstantial.<sup>42</sup> Consequently, Dio falls into a category, as Salmeri describes, of new intellectuals—"rhetors and philosophers, or personages qualified as both, who plunged into the political life of their cities in the turbulent middle years

of the first century BC and gave political life a decidedly ‘personalist’ appearance.”<sup>43</sup> This explains Dio’s philosophical tendencies, such as discussing the general concepts of *homónoia*, concord, and *stásis*, discord, which were “favourite themes in Greek political philosophy,” while avoiding the discussion of mundane details.<sup>44</sup> It is uncertain whether some of Dio’s orations were meant to address real problems occurring in the cities that he visited or simply to educate his audience on a philosophical matter.

## **I. Law**

One of the primary interests of Rome in its provinces was the enforcement of Roman law and, where local law was permitted, assurance that these laws were observed faithfully. In Asia Minor, Rome’s ability to enforce law was incomplete and as a result, provincials regularly violated, whether consciously or unconsciously, all manners of Roman and local law.

Roman officials encountered problems within the Anatolian provinces because the legal codes and precedents for governing these provinces were insufficient to address their problems. One famous example is the practice of Christianity within the province of Bithynia et Pontus, which prompted Pliny, who had no standard punishment for the practice of Christianity to follow and who feared to overstep the limits of his *imperium*, to consult Emperor Trajan for guidance. Trajan confirms that Pliny’s decision, which was to only punish Christians who refused to honor the gods, had been correct, but he also tells Pliny not to actively seek out Christians.<sup>45</sup> Had Trajan not been consulted, Pliny may have applied a more rigorous prosecution of Christians, which, while justifiable under existing Roman law, would have been detrimental to the interests of Rome.

In another example, Pliny had access to laws and precedents dealing with a particular problem, but covered areas outside of his jurisdiction. Pliny was approached by fosterers in his province who hoped “that Pliny would reverse the local custom in favor of the Roman rule which enabled them to recover their costs when *threptoí* [foundlings] were claimed.”<sup>46</sup> He was unable to decide what course of action to take, even after consulting an “edict referring to Adania” issued by Augustus, letters from Vespasian and Titus to the Spartans, a letter from Titus to the Achaeans, letters from Domitian to governors Avidius Nigrinus and Armenius Brocchus, and a letter from Domitian to the Spartans. These laws and precedents failed to apply to the empire generally and Pliny also feared that some of the letters were inaccurate or forgeries, so he appealed to Trajan to receive a general ruling.<sup>47</sup> Even Trajan, in response, admitted that he could find nothing in his records that would apply to Pliny’s province or the empire at large and he was unwilling to apply the laws of other regions to Bithynia et Pontus. Consequently, Trajan made a decision relevant to the present case, to favor the Greek custom, but, unwilling to make a general ruling, left decision the issue undecided for other provinces.<sup>48</sup>

Similarly, when Pliny had been asked by provincials to preside over cases dealing with granting free-born rights to former slaves in accordance with a letter from Domitian and with precedent established by previous proconsuls, he had to consult Trajan on how to proceed, since he lacked any formal ruling on the subject and was unsure whether such a grant would violate the limitations of his *imperium*. A decree made by the Senate relating to such cases had no provision for provinces except those with senatorial governors. Even when Trajan received Pliny’s letter, he had no solution to offer to Pliny, for even with access to archives in Rome, Trajan and his staff could not locate the senatorial decree to which Pliny had referred.<sup>49</sup> Additionally, when Pliny sent a petition to Trajan from the city of Nicaea, which dealt with a

right granted to the city by Augustus, Trajan was unsure whether this grant was actually made. In response, he ordered Pliny to investigate with help from his procurators.<sup>50</sup> Such grants were not always formal or documented, which created great confusion for later administrators with no access to definitive records. Sherwin-White, more generally, observes that “there seem to have been no organized public archives in the province at this time.”<sup>51</sup>

Pliny, who had often lacked laws and precedent to take legal action in his province, decided to ask Trajan to send rescripts that would afford future governors some guidance when addressing the same problems. For example, Pliny asked Trajan if he would set a “permanent regulation,” determining whether or not cities have priority over private creditors in the collection of debts, just as the imperial treasury had priority over other collectors. Trajan, however, told Pliny that he had no right to establish a general rule, instead preferring to leave the ruling to the cities themselves, despite how convenient a general ruling would be for administering Bithynia et Pontus.<sup>52</sup> Similarly, in dealing with the entrance fee for men joining the senate in various cities, Pliny asked Trajan for a fixed sum so that each fee would be the same amount and again, Trajan, saying that “it is impossible for [him] to lay down a general rule,” declared that each city should decide for itself.<sup>53</sup> In yet another instance, Trajan tells Pliny that no general rule can be established in the punishing of peoples charged of practicing Christianity.<sup>54</sup> In these cases, Trajan was not failing his duties as an emperor, but exercising his preference for local customs and case-by-case governance. Nevertheless, Pliny, like many other Roman officials who sought to create uniformity when preferable,<sup>55</sup> was left with a more difficult task of governing his province and would likely, due to similar ambiguities in the proper application of his *imperium*, be forced to appeal time and again to Trajan for guidance.<sup>56</sup> The picture that emerges from these examples is of proconsuls identifying many problems in their

Anatolian provinces, but lacking the legal grounds to exercise their *imperia* to solve them. After taking time to check legal codes, even ones from outside of their provinces, proconsuls would have to send a letter to Rome and to wait for a response before they would have permission to take action. Such delays could potentially compound the severity of the original problem.

Because various cities in the Roman provinces, including Greek cities in Asia Minor, possessed special rights and statuses and because these cities had to be governed separately from ordinary provincial cities, proconsuls had to be extra careful when exercising their *imperium* within them. The common lack of formal rules regarding privileged cities and the lacking documentation of such grants caused great confusion for proconsuls, who were often told by provincials, sometimes incorrectly, that they were exempt from certain rulings. For example, the city of Amisus, a free city which was permitted to administer its own laws, attempted to form a benefit society, which would directly violate Trajan's ban on such organizations. Pliny, who had been charged in his *mandata* to monitor organizations, was left to consult Trajan, who informed him that although such a society would violate the ban, Amisus was a special case and granted an exception.<sup>57</sup>

Many cities, such as Rhodes, Tarsus, and Apameia had received special privileges because of their loyalty or assistance to Rome.<sup>58</sup> Dio speaks of an attempt to secure a special status for his native city of Prusa by means of an embassy to the emperor, but he admits that legal independence "is sometimes impossible to acquire."<sup>59</sup> Obviously, with so many other cities already possessing such benefits, the Romans did not desire to create further confusion by granting such privileges easily.

The provincials of Asia Minor made the enforcement of law ever more difficult by wasting the administrators' time with trivial and falsified cases. A very telling example of this

practice is the case brought before Pliny by Claudius Eumpolus, who was acting on behalf of Flavius Archippus, against Dio Chrysostom. The two separate charges were that Dio refused to give his accounts for the public building project that he had planned and that Dio had engaged in an act of desecration, by burying his wife and son in the same building that housed a statue of the emperor.<sup>60</sup> Pliny asked Trajan how to proceed, being especially careful to not overstep his *imperium* in a case that concerned his *mandata* and that also concerned a statue of the emperor. In response, Trajan brushed off both charges, thinking it absurd to concern himself with a statue and, having received Dio's defense along with Pliny's letter, telling Pliny that Dio had never refused to give his accounts and just to be sure that Dio does allow his accounts to be inspected.<sup>61</sup> We know from other letters that Flavius Archippus, the man for whom Eumpolus had brought these charges against Dio, was another philosopher.<sup>62</sup> We can infer from these trivial charges that had no real chance of incriminating Dio that Archippus and Dio were rivals and that this use of the Roman legal system was just another arena in which a Greek provincial could attack one of his rivals.

In addition to special cases of personal rivalries played out through use of the Roman court system, other practices of abusing the system were employed. For example, Pliny, when asking how to address the practice of Christianity within his province, wondered if he should take note of a circulating pamphlet that contained the names of people suspected of practicing Christianity. Although Trajan tells Pliny to ignore such pamphlets, since their accuracy cannot be verified, the pamphlets reveal a way in which the provincials could use Roman law to harm their enemies or at the very least to tarnish their reputations.<sup>63</sup> Lintott observes that many court cases in the provinces were referred upward to proconsuls, other magistrates, and even to emperors and

also notes that “if cases and problems were not referred upwards, politics and jurisdiction could have proceeded in an autonomous fashion, without intervention by the Romans.”<sup>64</sup>

Also, in most Greek communities under Roman rule, provincials often made requests for intervention in general local affairs. Some requests were made with the intent to use the Romans to harm other provincials, while other requests were made for lack of certainty concerning their sovereignty. Governors who paid close attention to the municipal affairs within their provinces instilled a sense of wariness among local officials, who did not wish to overstep their authority. A simple consultation or deferment to a Roman official would prevent accidental illegal actions, but would also occupy that official’s precious time.<sup>65</sup>

Roman officials had a difficult time deciding how to exercise their *imperium* both legally and effectively in cases where a Roman or local law had been disregarded or unconsciously violated in a widespread area. For example, Pliny asked Trajan if he should remove provincial councilmen from office who held citizenship in other cities. He knew that although holding multiple citizenships was prohibited, many councilors in most cities in Bithynia et Pontus had acquired them anyway, but he also knew that to punish that many rich and important men would have dire consequences on local politics throughout the province and would instill a hatred for Roman rule. Predictably, Trajan instructs Pliny to leave these men in office, but to enforce the prohibition of holding multiple citizenships in the future.<sup>66</sup> In another example, Pliny knew that proconsuls were “free to vary the penalty” of certain crimes and decided to consult Trajan concerning the prosecution of Christians, which, if he were to simply uphold the law, would require him to inflict capital punishment on a wide scale. He knew how difficult it would be to hunt down the numerous Christians in his province and knew that such a mass hunt of ordinary people would greatly disturb the peace. It is easy to understand why Trajan would tell Pliny to

enforce the law when necessary, but not to actively seek out illegal Christians.<sup>67</sup> In both cases, the law could not be enforced to the letter for fear of political disorder, which was in the Romans' interest to avoid. Instead, the proconsul, after checking with the emperor, was forced to adopt a lenient policy of enforcement.

Additionally, Roman officials had difficulty with illegal actions that had been taken over long periods of time and that had sometimes been established as local precedents. For example, Pliny noticed the use of criminals who had been sentenced to work in the mines to do the work of public slaves. Although Pliny knew that, in order to ensure that local laws were being faithfully enforced, he should have these men sent back to the mines to resume their original sentences, he did not want to upset the local precedent nor send back the criminals, who were leading quiet lives and many of whom were old, so he sought Trajan's counsel. In response, Trajan told Pliny to send the men back to serve their original sentences in accordance with local law, excepting those who were too old or infirm to work the mines.<sup>68</sup> As with widespread violations of law, long-established violations were addressed with irregular lenience and also created confusion for Roman officials, even men at the proconsular level like Pliny.

Another noteworthy obstacle to the assurance of law abidance in the Anatolian provinces was the corruption of provincial officials found in cities across the region. For example, Pliny reveals that at celebrations of coming-of-age, marriage, entrance to a public office, and the dedication of public buildings, gifts of denarii were given as presents. Pliny decided that small gifts for ceremonial purposes should be permissible, but that large gifts should be considered illegal transfers of money or even bribes. Trajan, trusting that his legate knew the situation better than he, accepted Pliny's judgment on the matter.<sup>69</sup> Pliny also reported to Trajan that a couple of expensive attempts at building an aqueduct in Nicomedia had been abandoned before their

completion. Trajan then instructed Pliny to investigate the abandoned building projects to see if “people have profited by this starting and abandoning of aqueducts.”<sup>70</sup> Trajan’s concern suggests that embezzlement of funds was not uncommon.

Dio’s *Discourses* also supply plenty of evidence of provincial corruption. He reports that it was a common practice for the men of Rhodes to honor city benefactors and prominent Romans by inscribing their names on statues within their city, but that in order to save money, they were erasing the names of previous benefactors in order to do so.<sup>71</sup> Although Dio encountered much opposition in his attempt to make this practice illegal,<sup>72</sup> the punishment for the general defacing statues was execution<sup>73</sup> and the punishment for erasing even one word from any official tablet was also execution.<sup>74</sup> Nevertheless, because the majority of Rhodian officials favored this practice, despite its impiousness,<sup>75</sup> the city did not cease changing inscriptions. In another example, Dio himself was accused of blocking the assembling of Prusa’s *boulê*, of “misleading a wicked proconsul as to cause him to torture the people and to banish as many as possible, and even to put some to death,” of cooperating with a tyrant who would “take by force the cities and their governments,” and of ensuring that all acts of the city’s government were made to suit his wishes.<sup>76</sup> Whether or not these facts are true or exaggerated, they express the real fears of the elite within Prusa. These accusations also reveal the sorts of ways that men would attempt or succeed in exploiting their cities.

In addition to corruption by the local legal administrators, Roman officials themselves, even up to the level of proconsul, were found guilty of disobeying laws and exploiting the provinces. With outstanding freedom in the use of *imperium*, a proconsul had even the ability to exact capital punishment on any non-Roman in his province.<sup>77</sup> Therefore, it is no surprise that some proconsuls abused their authority and exceeded the limitations of their *imperium*. As a

safeguard against corrupt proconsuls, cities could appeal to Rome when they were treated unjustly. Sometimes these appeals would culminate in the prosecution of their governor in what was called a *repetundae* case. These prosecutions usually occurred after the governor had left the province and therefore could not halt the conduct of a misbehaving proconsul.<sup>78</sup> Additionally, because the life and dignity of a proconsul was at stake in a *repetundae* case, leniency in Rome made winning difficult for the provincials. Consequently, Augustus passed a new *repetundae* procedure in 4 BCE that allowed the simple restitution of value of what a magistrate had stolen. While this type of suit failed to punish corrupt officials, cases were more likely to be won and most of the damage would be repaired.<sup>79</sup> The major crimes that would culminate in a *repetundae* charge were, for example, receipt of bribes and the exaction of violence (*saevitia*) upon provincials.<sup>80</sup>

One famous example of a corrupt official is the case of Julius Bassus, who, according to Sherwin-White, was likely proconsul of Bithynia et Pontus during some period of time between 100 and 102 and was prosecuted in 102-103, not too long before Pliny's proconsulship.<sup>81</sup> In a letter to Cornelius Ursus in Book IV, Pliny describes Bassus's trial. Pliny, priding himself on being chosen to lay "the foundations of the whole defence" of Bassus, proves to be a great source for this trial. Pliny reveals that Bassus was on trial for *furta* (thefts) and *rapinas* (pillaging) during his term as proconsul, while Bassus declares that he had just "thoughtlessly accepted certain gifts from the provincials as their friend." After the prosecution and defense were heard, two men proposed punishments for Bassus. Baebius Macer "proposed that Bassus should be dealt with under the law dealing with the restitutions of monies extorted" and backed his proposal with strict adherence to law, while Caepio Hippo proposed "that his penalty should be assessed by commission without loss of status" and backed his proposal by the Senate's ability to

reduce the severity of punishment under special circumstances—the present circumstance being the existing precedent of Bassus’s actions. Both proposals had support, but Caepio’s was passed. Pliny reports that there were crowds of people delighted at the result and attributes Bassus’s success to public sympathy, his name, and his pitiable figure, “bent with the afflictions and poverty of his old age.”<sup>82</sup> Regardless of Bassus’s success in court, however, we know that all of Bassus’s acts in Bithynia and Pontus were nevertheless annulled, as Pliny reports in a letter to Trajan.<sup>83</sup> The extensive care taken in this case reveals how serious the Romans were about preventing proconsular corruption. In addition to providing a strong example of corruption itself, this case, because within is revealed that Bassus’s actions had “precedent,” demonstrates a tradition of proconsuls testing the limits of their *imperia* in Asia Minor.

In addition to Bassus’s trial, the *repetundae* case in 106-107 of Varenus Rufus, who was proconsul of Bithynia et Pontus in 105-106, demonstrates Roman corruption within the provinces.<sup>84</sup> Again, this case is revealed by Pliny, who spoke on behalf of Varenus. In this case, the Greeks provincials attempted to block Varenus’s attempt to call witnesses from his province, but he was eventually allowed permission to do so.<sup>85</sup> The Greeks attempted to reverse this permission by appealing to the consuls and to the emperor himself, but were not successful.<sup>86</sup> In a later letter, Pliny reveals that the Greeks had invoked “the law of restitution of money” against Varenus. Pliny also reports that in Varenus’s case, both sides attempted to convince the emperor to favor one side over the other.<sup>87</sup> This corruption case must have been significant if the emperor himself could have been involved. Ultimately, it appears from one of Pliny’s letters that the charge against Varenus would be dropped because, as Pliny reports, it was regarded as “an ill-advised venture” for the Greeks to continue to undertake. This is likely because of the “large number of prominent citizens” who acted on behalf of Varenus.<sup>88</sup>

In addition to definite examples of corruption, we have general evidence of corrupt practices and evidence of fear of corruption. From the Roman side, we have Trajan's letter to Pliny, which was in response to Pliny's concern for allowing additional soldiers to accompany a prefect named Gavius Bassus. Trajan warned Pliny to distinguish between men who truly need their requests granted and men who wish to extend their privileges.<sup>89</sup> Also, when Pliny asked Trajan how he could convince rich men in his province to borrow from the public funds, Trajan, fearing that Pliny may misuse his *imperium*, reminded him not to force loans on unwilling persons because such an action "is not in accordance with the justice of [their] times."<sup>90</sup> In another instance, Pliny, according to Sherwin-White, exposed himself "to a formal charge under the extortion law," although, fortunately for him, neither he nor Trajan took notice.<sup>91</sup> In this instance, a man named Julius Largus, from Pontus, left his estate and 50,000 sesterces to Pliny, while leaving the rest of his money to the cities of Heraclea and Tium for building projects or "five-yearly games" in honor of Trajan.<sup>92</sup> He did this, it being difficult to leave inheritances to municipalities, to "ensure that his will would not be upset."<sup>93</sup> Accepting such money, even if Pliny meant to invest it faithfully, could be grounds for a charge, but fortunately for him, Trajan simply acknowledged the will left to Pliny.<sup>94</sup> Because corruption was common enough to arouse fears in Rome, many regulations, such as the duty of every governor and provincial quaestor to deposit copies of their accounts "in two cities of the province and deliver a further copy to the treasury in Rome" after their tours of duty,<sup>95</sup> were enacted to for preventative reasons.

We also have evidence from Dio concerning the corruption of Roman proconsuls. In addressing the Nicomedians on concord with the Nicaeans, Dio argues that feuds between provincial cities have allowed and will continue to allow governors to exercise tyrannical power, since a governor could escape the wrath of one city by siding with its rival.<sup>96</sup> Because cities or

*groups* of cities were able to undertake *repetundae* suits, Dio's claim that city rivalries play into the hands of such governors is more easily understood.<sup>97</sup> Additionally, Dio claims that governors handed out titles of primacy to different cities in order to encourage such rivalries.<sup>98</sup>

Although Rome took great care to see that Roman and local laws were in place and enforced in its Anatolian provinces, the administration process often challenged and hindered. Proconsuls had difficulty exercising their *imperia* even when problems were easily identifiable, when they lacked legal provisions to back their decisions, when cities possessed or reported to possess special privileges, and when law violations had become widespread or local precedent. Additionally, Greek political administrators and especially Roman officials created a challenge for Roman interests when they engaged in corrupt practices, such as exploiting their provinces or overstepping their *imperia*.

## II. Political Discord

Another fundamental interest that Rome had in its provinces was the preservation of political stability. As Dio once put it, a city "could never be obedient to law if it is foolish and disorderly."<sup>99</sup> Additionally, when properly maintained, political order helped to establish efficiency for administrators and harmony for residents. In Asia Minor, it was not uncommon for political order to be challenged by rioting, demagoguery, and rivalry within and between provincial cities.

Rioting is the most visible example of political disorder that appears in Asia Minor's history and for Dio it is a common theme. Dio's *Discourse 46* is a response to a mob that had suspected that Dio played a role in the increased prices of grain in Prusa that year while there was a grain shortage. During his oration, Dio was interrupted by his impatient audience that was

making a “tumult.”<sup>100</sup> Also, during his oration to the riot, Dio chastises the type of person who would stone a fellow citizen, burn his house, and burn his family.<sup>101</sup> These were evidently the threats that the mob had been making.

Years later, Dio reveals that the right to hold their *ekklesia* in Prusa had been revoked and restored again by proconsul Varenus.<sup>102</sup> This revocation had been in response to riots within the city and since “governors and emperors rarely intervened in the internal affairs of the *poleis* of Asia Minor, and virtually only as a result of serious disorder,”<sup>103</sup> we know that the rioting had been significant.<sup>104</sup> Bekker-Nielsen speculates that this suspension was generated by the violent and polarized political discourse that had sprung up in Prusa in light of the addition of the one hundred new city councilors. That Dio had feared division and factionalism in Prusa’s politics appears to be well-founded.<sup>105</sup>

Also, in anticipation of Varenus’s next visit to Prusa, Dio had several things to remind his disorderly fellow citizens. Having already seen the consequences of disorder and knowing that, as Strabo reports, the Prusans had once obtained freedom for “having shown a friendly disposition towards the Romans in the conduct of their government,”<sup>106</sup> Dio wished for the city to make a good impression. Dio said that Varenus trusted Prusa and urged the city to retain this proconsul’s support by keeping the city orderly, remembering that “nothing which takes place in the cities escapes the attention of the proconsuls,” who receive reports of disorder and violations of law.<sup>107</sup> Additionally, Dio compared Prusa’s disorder to that of Athens at the close of the Peloponnesian War, which was only solved by bringing a curb “from without,” the Spartan Lysander.<sup>108</sup> Dio did not want an external force taking hold of Prusa’s affairs. Additionally, for the same purpose, Dio compared the conditions in a discordant city to “intractable horses,” that are inevitably disciplined by their master.<sup>109</sup> Dio then reminded his fellow citizens that an ideal

city is similar to a community-oriented swarm of bees. Although Dio admitted that there are always a few bees that devour the honey, the farmer of the bees, the Roman proconsul in this metaphor, would tolerate the small losses instead of throwing the bees into confusion.<sup>110</sup>

However, when rioting was excessive, proconsuls evidently took action against the cities that were incapable of governing themselves successfully.

Generally, “in the Greek cities when the have-nots found themselves in dire straits they had nothing to lose if they raided the notables’ houses and attracted the attention of the Roman authorities with their riotous behavior.” Thus, although the social elite was interested in keeping the poor satisfied in order to prevent the intervention of the Romans in municipal affairs, rioting was a common and almost default response to hardship.<sup>111</sup> For example, in addition to Prusa’s riot, Sherwin-White reports “a tantalizingly incomplete inscription from Nicomedia, of the proconsular period,” that “mentions riots over the high rate of prices, which the council had difficulty in controlling, until apparently it invoked the aid of the proconsul.”<sup>112</sup> Riots, when severe, would temporarily disable cities to govern themselves effectively and would require the time and attention of the proconsuls, who would subsequently punish these cities. Rioting was problematic for all governing parties.

Another challenge for Roman authority was the rise of demagogues within provinces who upset the local political order. Dio himself is a prime example of a man who may have posed such a threat, although ultimately he decided to remain a philosopher instead of a politician. Pliny, in a letter to Trajan, mentions that by the law of Pompey, Bithynian cities may “confer their citizenship on anyone they choose, provided that it is not someone who is already a citizen of another Bithynian city.” He also reveals that “every city has several senators who hold citizenship elsewhere,” who clearly violate this law.<sup>113</sup> Lintott claims that this ban is “an attempt

to prevent a few men becoming dominant throughout the province.”<sup>114</sup> Dio possessed citizenship in his home city of Prusa, and in Nicomedia, Nicaea, and Apameia, a city which honored many Prusan notables with citizenship.<sup>115</sup> Also, Dio, when speaking of his honors to the Apameians, a city that had also given citizenship to his father and grandfather, said that “cities in general” and most of those “of equal rank” with Apameia have granted him citizenship and even membership in the *boulê*.<sup>116</sup> This suggests that Dio held honors in even more cities than those that we can identify.

In addition to his citizenship, Dio reveals in other orations that his influence in the Anatolian provinces was widespread and strong. With respect to other provincials, Dio claims that he had such a widespread reputation that “many people in many lands” asked him to “take charge of their public affairs.”<sup>117</sup> Dio was so influential within his own city that, although he ultimately refused the honor, many of his fellow citizens attempted to make him *archôn*.<sup>118</sup> Dio was even an honored friend of the Apameians and held reasonable clout in the city’s affairs, even though he was from Prusa, the city’s rival.<sup>119</sup> In addition to his reputation among other provincials, Dio also possessed influential connections in Rome, including proconsuls and to some degree, Nerva and Trajan.<sup>120</sup> Although these connections were resented by some people in his province, they could also be used to bolster his position in the province.<sup>121</sup>

While it is unclear whether Dio really was a threat to the political order of the Anatolian provinces, the accusations made against him suggest that he was truly a potential menace and that other men like Dio had become tyrannical. Dio was accused of tyrannical and demagogical actions many times.<sup>122</sup> Some of his boasts in his orations could only aggravate these claims. For example, Dio compared himself to Socrates with respect to his influence within his native city and he boasted that his bill of indictment was longer than Socrates’s.<sup>123</sup> Additionally, in an

oration to Tarsus, Dio, perhaps with intent to be humorous, actually called himself a demagogue.<sup>124</sup> Specifically, Dio was accused of enrolling his friends and allies into the newly-expanded Prusan *boulê*.<sup>125</sup> As Bekker-Nielsen notes, “that [Dio] refutes this allegation in some detail indicates that his fellow-citizens had taken it seriously.”<sup>126</sup> One bill of indictment against Dio included misleading a proconsul, perhaps Bassus or Varenus, ensuring the success of a tyrant, perhaps the same proconsul, and bribing the masses with enough money to prevent legal reproach.<sup>127</sup> Furthermore, it is likely that Dio’s son became an *archôn* and although Dio denies it, many Prusans believe that Dio used his influence to win that position for his son.<sup>128</sup> Also, when Dio spoke of his plan to build a grand colonnade to rival the wondrous public works in other cities, he was called a tyrant because he had to remove some prominent existing buildings, including, as he says, a temple of Zeus.<sup>129</sup>

Fear of demagogues was not limited to people living in the provinces, but also affected Rome itself. For example, Plutarch, as did other Romans no doubt, held contempt for “certain inhabitants of Chios, Galatia, and Bithynia who are never content with the fame and power they enjoy in their own cities, but hanker without any real hope after a place in the Senate and, still not satisfied, aspire to a praetorship or even a consulate.”<sup>130</sup> Men like Dio, regardless of their actual intentions, did possess the wherewithal to upset political order for their own ends and to become problems not only to their fellow provincials, but also to Roman governance. Even if their intentions were benign, they created noteworthy alarm simply because of the possibility of demagoguery.

Another type of political disorder, rivalries between notable individuals within Greek cities, often impaired the progress of politics on a local level and sometimes jeopardized the integrity of the system itself. As Bekker-Nielsen observes, “friendly competition and social

rivalry within the *agôn* could easily get out of control and once public order had broken down, it was difficult to restore.”<sup>131</sup> One example, mentioned in the previous section of this study, is the rivalry between Dio and Flavius Archippus that made itself known by use of the Roman legal system. Archippus’s intent to harm Dio brought Claudius Eumolpus, who formally made the charge against Dio, into the squabble.<sup>132</sup> It would not be surprising for individual rivalries within the social elite to expand into larger feuds in such a manner. This charge, however trivial from a strict legal standpoint,<sup>133</sup> wasted the Romans’ time and also delayed the progress of local political action—Dio’s public building project.<sup>134</sup>

In another instance, Pliny asked Trajan for an architect to examine some building because a local architect had reported that a gymnasium was flawed in design. This architect was the rival of the one who had made the designs for the gymnasium.<sup>135</sup> Sherwin-White argues that the purpose of Pliny’s letter describing these public building problems was to convince Trajan to send an architect and not to gain permission for the projects, as the projects were already in progress.<sup>136</sup> He claims that Pliny required an independent opinion, since he could not “trust the local men, who were involved in the civic factions.”<sup>137</sup> Again, personal rivalries slowed down the progress of municipal procedures.

Cities were also affected by rivalries on a larger scale that took the form of polarized political bodies and official or unofficial factions. Within the context of Greek cities, Bekker-Nielsen explains the concept of *stásis* as “disruptive conflict within the community” and claims that “the fear of civil violence among the many or of oppression by the few was real enough, and well founded.”<sup>138</sup> Dio had a particular interest in *stásis* from a philosophical standpoint. This theme appears throughout his political orations. He constantly emphasized the importance of harmony and berates the type of people who would jeopardize it.<sup>139</sup>

In many of his orations, Dio reveals the *stásis* that had existed within the cities he visited throughout Asia Minor. In Nicaea, he lectured its citizens about the advantages of *homónoia*, or harmony, within cities. This most likely served as a response to a previous period of conflict in the city or a fear of coming conflict.<sup>140</sup> Also, Dio spoke of political discord in Tarsus between the city's *ekklêsia* and its *boulê* arising often and with only short and uneasy periods of concord between outbreaks.<sup>141</sup> Additionally, in addressing a general body of citizens at Tarsus, he referred to the people's current grievance against philosophers. Although the grievance in particular is unknown, it is known that philosophers played a prominent part in the affairs of Tarsus, which suggests that there had been discord between the citizenry and certain power players in their city's politics.<sup>142</sup> Dio also denounced the political clubs in Greek cities, fearing that they would destroy *homónoia*.<sup>143</sup> Dio revealed that "councilors divided into factions, *hetaireiai*, forming groups around the leading figures in conflict."<sup>144</sup> Overall, Dio's repeated references to factionalism and intra-city discord suggest that they were common within Greek cities and that they were serious enough to create fear and worry among the provincials.

Bekker-Nielson observes that as "the social structure of republican Rome had a good deal in common with contemporary Greek cities," Rome also possessed "the Greek horror of civic violence."<sup>145</sup> Just as with Dio's *Discourses*, Pliny's *Epistulae* indicate signs of political unrest caused by political factions in Asia Minor, at least as far as the province of Bithynia et Pontus is concerned. For example, Pliny writes to Trajan about a widespread fire in Nicomedia that burned while the provincials simply watched it burning. He suggests that he should assemble a company of fireman in the city to prevent future disasters. However, although Trajan admits that there are such companies elsewhere, the emperor rejects Pliny's suggestion out of fear that the company, even if limited to 150 men as per Pliny's suggestion, would become a political club like others

which were “responsible for the political disturbances in [Pliny’s] province.”<sup>146</sup> Pliny’s request, although denied, should not come as a surprise. Fires were a real concern for the Roman Empire. Several great fires in Rome are known, “despite the organization of the *vigils*, some 7,000 strong.” Also, there existed bodies of firemen in Italy and in the Latin-speaking provinces. It is evident that Pliny meant only to solve a problem in the same manner in which it is solved in Italy.<sup>147</sup> If this practice were eagerly implemented elsewhere, then Trajan’s fear of political clubs must be appropriate or else paranoid in a way not befitting an emperor who is overwhelmingly pragmatic and rational otherwise.

In another instance, Pliny sent a petition to Trajan from Amisus that asked permission to form a benefit society. Trajan granted permission to form this benefit society because the city was “free and confederate” and was consequently allowed to make its own laws. Trajan expressed, however, that he only granted permission because he trusted that contributions to the society would help the poor and would not be “used for riotous and unlawful assemblies.” He also reminded Pliny that these societies are strictly forbidden in all cities subject to Roman law.<sup>148</sup> Again, the fear of political societies must have been warranted if this was the only reason not to form a group to aid the poor. Rome was interested in the well-being of its provincials and would otherwise have encouraged its provinces’ initiative in providing for the poor in a fashion that would cost nothing to Rome. Although the Roman examples of political clubs do not display the discord and destruction that could be suffered as a result, they do reveal how factions were serious enough to demand the attention and concern of an emperor.

On a grander level, Asia Minor found itself plagued by rivalry between cities and groups of cities, in addition to the smaller conflicts that took place within cities. Dio reveals that Prusa and Apameia were rivals, probably because of economic concerns<sup>149</sup> and he likens their

“wrangling and hatred” to an insurrection within one city, due to the close proximity of Prusa and Apameia.<sup>150</sup> When addressing Tarsus, Dio reveals that the city was quarreling with Aegae, which had “developed a prejudice against [Tarsus] as being obnoxious and oppressive toward the other cities,”<sup>151</sup> competing with Mallus over territorial claims to land of “no value,”<sup>152</sup> and suffering criticisms from many smaller cities, such as Soli and Adana.<sup>153</sup> In this instance, it was not simply a matter of two groups at odds, but a large number of smaller cities expressing opposition simultaneously or cooperatively against the largest city of the province. Dio also spent quite a bit of time trying to end the rivalry between Nicomedia and Nicaea, dedicating an entire oration to the task.<sup>154</sup> Dio, revealing just how common feuds between cities were, contributed some more examples when he offhandedly mentioned quarrels between the Apameians and the men of Antioch and between the Smyrnaeans and the Ephesians.<sup>155</sup>

Dio was particularly sensitive to the issue of feuding cities because he knew the Romans’ perspective on the matter. For example, he told the Nicomedians that they must “give the provincial governors occasion to respect [them]” by being “concerned for the welfare of the whole Bithynian people.”<sup>156</sup> He also meant to avoid laughter and humiliation from Romans, who saw the struggle for primacy as a petty conflict.<sup>157</sup> Dio also knew that inter-city rivalry was a hassle for Roman proconsuls, who had to respond to problems related to intense competition, such as overspending in public building projects that were meant to outdo those of other cities.<sup>158</sup> Most importantly, Dio feared that too much rivalry would require intervention from the Romans. He twice made a metaphor comparing the Greek cities to horses pulling a chariot. If horses are not obedient to their driver and instead fight amongst themselves and pull away from one another, “the danger increases in proportion to the strength and speed of the horses.” Because

this discord endangered the driver of the chariot, Rome, proconsuls or even Rome itself, if the discord were serious enough, would, Dio feared, pull the metaphorical reins.<sup>159</sup>

A common cause for city rivalries was competition over titles, status markers, and the favor of the Roman proconsul or emperor. As Bekker-Nielsen observes, “cities battled to maintain and reinforce their position vis-à-vis their neighboring communities.”<sup>160</sup> A telling example of this type of rivalry is that between Nicaea and Nicomedia.<sup>161</sup> Dio, who delivered an oration to the Nicomedians on this subject, revealed that the root of this conflict was not social difference, economic competition, or even a territorial claim, but titles and nominal primacy.<sup>162</sup> One title that the cities fought over was *neôkoros*, a title that denoted the presence of the imperial cult within the city.<sup>163</sup> Although Nicomedia’s more active and long-term involvement in establishing imperial cults put the city ahead of its rival, Nicaea still fancied itself “*prôtê polis tês eparcheias*,” or “first city of the province,” indicating long-term involvement in the competition for titles.<sup>164</sup> These cities’ rivalry was problematic for its players because, as Dio states, smaller cities would take advantage of Nicomedia and Nicaea by allowing these larger quarreling cities to grow dependent upon them for support.<sup>165</sup> Additionally, because these smaller cities aligned themselves with one or the other, the scale of the feud grew beyond two large cities into a rivalry between groups of cities. This rivalry was also problematic because, as Dio says, proconsuls of Bithynia et Pontus would avoid consequences for misbehaving in one city by winning the support of its rival.<sup>166</sup> Although Dio tried to end the competition over titles between Nicomedia and Nicaea, we know that he was not persuasive because, for example, Nicomedia continued to claim exclusive primacy on their coinage for some time.<sup>167</sup>

City rivalries, especially those most devoted to competition over titles, were likely fueled by a desire to receive praise by notable people. One such notable was Dio, who freely shared

praise to nearly every city he visited, although he denied that he was a flatterer.<sup>168</sup> In other orations, Dio praises Rhodes, which he declares is “the most prosperous of all of the Greeks”<sup>169</sup> and that the city had pre-eminence “over all other cities save one” (Rome),<sup>170</sup> Tarsus, which he calls “greatest of all the cities of Cilicia,”<sup>171</sup> Celaenae, which he calls “inferior to none of the first rank,”<sup>172</sup> and Nicomedia, which he calls a *metropolis*.<sup>173</sup> Dio even expresses his preference of his native city of Prusa over Athens, Argos, and Sparta, “the foremost and most distinguished of the Greek cities,”<sup>174</sup> and praises the city as “far superior to all other communities.”<sup>175</sup> Cities sought to be recorded favorably in histories as well. Such praise is found in the *Geōgraphiká* of Strabo, who, for example, praises Nicaea as “the metropolis of Bithynia”<sup>176</sup> and calls Apameia “a great emporium of Asia,” which was “second only to Ephesus.”<sup>177</sup>

Although city rivalries are discussed in many ancient sources, Dio may have overstated their severity. The topics of *homónoia*, concord, and *stásis*, discord, were “favourite themes in Greek political philosophy generally and in the work of [Dio].”<sup>178</sup> Dio spends much of his time speaking about these topics on philosophical terms.<sup>179</sup> Bekker-Nielson notes, for example, that Dio’s oration on concord in Apameia is focused on the abstract virtues of *homónoia*. It does not discuss mundane realities.<sup>180</sup>

Dio also had a different outlook on the provinces of Asia Minor than did the majority of the Greeks living there. He viewed the region in an imperial context, while most provincials possessed an atomistic view of their cities. Dio identified that small cities would never become truly great by themselves.<sup>181</sup> This may be why in his oration to the Nicomedians, he imagines Nicomedia achieving concord not only with the Nicaea, but also with other cities such as Ephesus and Smyrna. Dio may have had a grander scheme to unite cities across Asia Minor for

some grander purpose.<sup>182</sup> Dio returns to this theme in an oration in Prusa, in which he speaks of his desire to make Prusa “head of a federation of cities.”<sup>183</sup>

Political discord was taxing for Rome to prevent and was potentially devastating to Roman interests. Riots upset local governments and often required Roman resources and effort in order to restore order. Demagogy had the potential to temporarily prevent the enforcement of local and Roman law in favor of the demagogue’s interests instead of Rome’s. The fear of demagogy itself created contention between local officials. Additionally, individual rivalries and factions generated confusion within cities, while city rivalries affected provinces at large. Rome’s fear of these concerns demonstrates that it had to carefully monitor its provinces in Asia Minor in order to maintain peaceful control.

### **III. Infrastructure and Finances**

The Romans also had a keen interest in the maintenance of provincial infrastructure and finances. Once again, the provinces of Asia Minor proved to be a challenge for Roman interests. Many of their public works were in disrepair, many cities lacked fundamental resources like water supplies, and many cities were financially irresponsible.

Throughout Pliny’s *Epistulae*, he reports the sorry state of important public buildings throughout Bithynia et Pontus, even those not yet fully built. The public bath at Prusa was, according to Pliny, “old and dilapidated.” Although the people were “anxious” for it to be rebuilt, it had been run down for a considerable period of time. Furthermore, the city required the emperor’s approval, the consent of the proconsul, and their proconsul’s aid in organizing the necessary funding in order to begin rebuilding the path. This suggests that it was not easy for provincials to keep buildings in working order.<sup>184</sup> In Nicomedia, a fire broke out that “destroyed

many private houses and also two public buildings (the Elder Citizens' Club and the Temple of Isis)." According to Pliny, this was allowed to happen because the people "stood watching the disaster without bestirring themselves to do anything to stop it" and because "there is not a single fire engine anywhere in the town, not a bucket nor any apparatus for fighting a fire."<sup>185</sup> Although Pliny suggested forming a company of firemen in order to prevent such problems in the future, Trajan did not grant this request, letting Pliny simply provide firefighting equipment for the citizens.<sup>186</sup> Although we cannot assume that fires were a very regular occurrence, this example does suggest that provincials did not always have the wherewithal to protect their investments.

Pliny also reported that the theatre at Nicaea was unfinished, sinking, unstable, and showing immense cracks. The state of the building was such that Pliny wondered whether it would be best simply to demolish it. He also reported that the benefactors of the theater had ambitions to provide the building with embellishments such as colonnades and a gallery, even though the building itself remained unfinished.<sup>187</sup> Also at Nicaea, a fire having destroyed their old gymnasium, a new and grand gymnasium was in the process of being built. This project, despite its grand scheme, was nevertheless faulty, both because the buildings were too far apart and because, according to an architect with whom Pliny spoke, "the walls cannot support the superstructure."<sup>188</sup> Trajan, whose tone in his letters is usually friendly and pragmatic, condescendingly responded to this overambitious building project by exclaiming: "these poor Greeks all love a gymnasium!" He also told Pliny that they must be satisfied with one that "suits their real needs."<sup>189</sup> In yet another example, Pliny reported that the people of Claudiopolis had begun excavating a public bath out of a mountainside and Trajan lamented that this bath had been "started in an unsuitable site."<sup>190</sup> Pliny also reported that there existed a "filthy sewer, a disgusting eyesore which gives off a noxious stench" that ran alongside a beautiful street in

Amastris, which not only tarnished the appearance of the city, but threatened the health of its inhabitants. It is unclear why Pliny would have needed Trajan's consent to fix this problem, but he received it.<sup>191</sup>

Pliny also reported the "unsightly ruins" of a large house in Dio's home city of Prusa. These ruins could not be removed because the house had been left by the will of a Claudius Polyaeus to Emperor Claudius and because the ground may have been consecrated. Although the people of Prusa were respectful enough to leave standing such an eyesore out of respect for a deified emperor, the reason that the house had fallen into ruin in the first place, according to Pliny, was from *spoliata* (pillaging) and *neglecta* (neglect). Now the citizens, who were eager to have this blemish removed from their city, required the aid of their proconsul and the consent of their emperor to do anything about it. Fortunately for them, Pliny suggested to Trajan the building of a new bath on the site and this plan was approved.<sup>192</sup> In a similar case in the same city, Dio hoped to replace some old and rundown buildings with a building project of his own. However, Dio was opposed by many of his fellow citizens and he describes it thusly:

But there was a lot of talk ... to the effect that I am dismantling the city; that I have laid it waste, virtually banishing the inhabitants; that everything has been destroyed, obliterated, nothing left ... One might have supposed that the Propylaea at Athens were being tampered with, or the Parthenon, or that we were wrecking the Heraeum of the Samians, or the Didymeium of the Milesians, or the temple of Artemis at Ephesus, instead of disgraceful, ridiculous ruins ... structures that used to make you blush, aye, be utterly confounded when the proconsuls essayed to enter, while men who bore you malice would gloat over you and laugh at your discomfiture ... shanties, moreover, in tumbledown

condition, held up by props, so that at the stroke of the hammer they quivered and threatened to fall apart.<sup>193</sup>

Although Dio's purpose here was only to justify his actions, he does paint a very vivid picture of the condition of many buildings in Prusa. And with Prusa being a relatively well-off city, it is likely that there were buildings just as rundown, if not in greater disrepair, in other cities. The resistance of Dio's opponents in this matter is also troubling, for it is apparent, by Dio feeling the need to defend himself, that public building projects, even ones that were clearly advantageous to the city, could be delayed or even halted. The geographer Strabo describes similar resistance to public building in the city of Ephesus, on the western coast of Asia Minor in the third century BCE. He reports that when Lysimachus, a king, wished to build a wall around the city of Ephesus, the inhabitants did not wish to move their homes and buildings to accommodate it, so, in order to ensure that this project would be approved, Lysimachus, during a heavy rain, blocked the sewers of the city, inundated its buildings, and was able to bring about the reorganization of the city by its inhabitants, who were then happy to make the change.<sup>194</sup>

Dio also reveals a tendency for organizers and builders of public works to be careless in planning and building. While Dio, he says, took earnest care in taking measurements, finding space, and making computations in order that his building project would be a success, he reports that "in other cities many public works have been ruined for lack of planning."<sup>195</sup> Dio also reported that his domestic affairs, after having returned from his exile, were in a "ruinous state."<sup>196</sup> This is especially surprising, because Dio still had family in Prusa, but apparently they were not diligent with the upkeep of Dio's property. It appears to be a general trend for provincials in Asia Minor to tolerate buildings in disrepair and even ruins, especially in Prusa. Contrary to Rome's interest in the diligent upkeep of public works in its provinces, even the

wealthiest of Anatolian cities housed ruins, crumbling and cracking public works, irresponsible builders, and much internal opposition to building maintenance.

Pliny's *Epistulae* and the Dio's *Discourses* reveal that, even though Rome wished reasonable well-being for its provincials, in some cities in Asia Minor, they did not have easy access to even the most basic supplies. For example, Pliny reported that the town of Sinope had no access to a water supply. Pliny, doing his duty as proconsul, funded the surveying of sixteen miles of land between the town and a water supply, offered to organize the funds necessary to build an aqueduct there, and received the emperor's permission to build.<sup>197</sup> The town would not have been able to build this aqueduct without his aid, despite having the financial wherewithal to fund it. Pliny also reported to Trajan that the people of Nicomedia, one of the larger cities in Bithynia et Pontus, lacked an aqueduct even though they had twice attempted to build an aqueduct before abandoning the project. Pliny hoped to make a third attempt at supplying the city with a water supply and Trajan was supportive, though angered by the money wasted in the previous attempts.<sup>198</sup>

Dio, in one of his orations, reported a riot in Prusa in response to a grain shortage. Not only was the lack of grain severe enough to provoke a riot, but Dio, chastising the mob, said that, although the price of grain in Prusa was terrible, that "there are cities in which it is always at that price, when conditions are best!"<sup>199</sup> If we can believe that Dio did not make that statement merely for rhetorical effect, then it is clear that other cities in Asia Minor lacked sufficient food supplies. Although grain shortages were periodic and by no means the norm, this particular shortage was severe enough for Dio, one of Prusa's elite, to not have "enough for [his] own needs."<sup>200</sup> Evidently, insufficient access to basic supplies was costly to the health and resources

of provincial cities and provided the have-nots with grounds for hatred for and uprisings against the local elite.

Although Sherwin-White boldly claims, on the one hand, that “there is no sign of any economic malaise in Bithynia” during Pliny’s time,<sup>201</sup> it is clear, on the other hand, that the Anatolian provinces did have an enormous problem with financial mismanagement. It is for this reason in particular that Pliny, a veteran of Roman finance, was selected specifically by Emperor Trajan to investigate each city’s finances in Bithynia et Pontus.<sup>202</sup> As Lintott observes, local Greek governments did not always handle self-governance well and “their financial embarrassment was an excellent excuse for roman intervention.”<sup>203</sup> Of the many ways in which finances were misused, the most wasteful was the erection of overly ambitious and extravagant public buildings.<sup>204</sup>

Pausanias, a Greek geographer living the second century, determined the prestige of a Greek *pólis* by its public buildings and amenities in addition to its legal status. Such amenities, he determined, included “the theatre, council house, and agora” at minimum and, if possible, “monumental temples, a gymnasium and colonnaded streets.”<sup>205</sup> This common attitude explains why the Greeks were so eager to devote their finances to public works. Public funds, the generosity of private benefactors, or some combination of the two were responsible for financing these projects.<sup>206</sup> A particularly troublesome problem arose when projects depended on money from private benefactors because, as Dio’s own project suggests, benefactors who had been eager to promise money for a project were often resistant to actually handing over the funding.<sup>207</sup> While it is true that a proconsul had the ability “to intervene and collect the sums promised for the construction of some building”<sup>208</sup> and that, at least legally, failure to make good on a promise of benefaction could incur debt not only upon the promised benefactor but also upon his heirs,<sup>209</sup>

suggesting that such promises were regulated, Dio's experience proves that project builders had little help in securing their funds in a timely manner. When resistance to the collection of funds delayed the progress of the building, finances were used suboptimally and when such problems delayed projects to the point of allowing these incomplete projects to fall into neglect, as some buildings did, according to Pliny, or when these problems halted a project altogether, public and private funds were severely squandered. Another problem with funding public works that created the same problems by delaying construction was the widespread tendency for men commissioning a project to keep their financial accounts hidden.<sup>210</sup>

Another problem associated with the funding of public building projects was the common practice of men running their families and themselves into debt by overspending as benefactors. For example, Julius Piso of Amisus, who had been illegally granted 40,000 denarii of public funds, was unable to repay his debt after he bankrupted himself by spending the money on the city.<sup>211</sup> Dio, who reports that his personal finances had grown thin due to his participation in funding public works, had a similar problem.<sup>212</sup> He had lost much of his property and wealth when he had gone into exile and when his sister died, being unable to collect the property that she had been holding for him. Additionally, he had resorted to taking out a loan in order to purchase his farm and had incurred other debts.<sup>213</sup> Despite these setbacks, he still invested in public works, perhaps against his better judgment. Similarly, Dio's grandfather had spent on Prusa "all that he had inherited from his father and grandfather, until he had nothing left."<sup>214</sup> More generally, Sherwin-White observes, citing Plutarch, that it was common for men to borrow "from friends to make a great show of liturgies."<sup>215</sup>

Pliny, who made a point to investigate finances, provides numerous examples of careless spending on incomplete building projects and on other public and private ventures. For example

the unfinished theater in Nicaea, which was sinking and cracking, had already cost ten million sesterces. Pliny expected that this structure, which he considered to be “none too solid,” might be demolished. Furthermore, the benefactors of the project were more concerned with supplying a colonnade and a gallery for the theater, among other things, than completing the building itself.<sup>216</sup> Again in Nicaea, the citizens spent “a large sum” on building a new gymnasium “on a much larger and more expensive scale than before.” Unfortunately, Pliny reports that the buildings were poorly planned and too scattered and that an architect had said that the walls could not support the superstructure.<sup>217</sup> This project, which wasted funds not only by being more extravagant than necessary, would require additional repair costs if it would not be abandoned altogether. Pliny also reported that in Nicomedia, two separate attempts to build an aqueduct were abandoned, costing 3,318,000 sesterces and 200,000 sesterces respectively. Pliny wrote to Trajan, hoping to make a third attempt at supplying the city with a water supply and Trajan approved of this project. However, Trajan worried that “people have profited by this starting and abandoning of aqueducts” and ordered Pliny to make an inquiry.<sup>218</sup> As Sherwin-White points out, “those in charge of public works were very apt to embezzle the building funds.”<sup>219</sup> Pliny also reports the “misapplication” of the Trajan’s generosity in spending funds raised by admission fees to the town council in Claudiopolis for the purpose of excavating a public bath “in a hollow at the foot of a mountain,” which was an “unsuitable” site for such a project.<sup>220</sup>

In addition to the careless spending of money while attempting to build public works, Pliny reports other financial wastefulness. Pliny reports that Byzantium, just across the Bosphorus from Asia Minor, had been spending 12,000 sesterces to send a loyal address to the emperor annually and 3,000 sesterces to send official greetings to the governor of Moesia. Consequently, Pliny suspended the first expense and suggested to Trajan to cut the second expense as well.

Trajan applauded Pliny for cutting the 12,000 sesterce-expense and confirmed his desire to cut the other expense as well.<sup>221</sup> More generally, Pliny reported that in Prusa, “large sums of money are detained in the hands of private individuals for various reasons, and further sums are paid out for quite illegal purposes.” Trajan, having learned that the accounts of cities throughout Bithynia et Pontus “are evidently in confusion,” sent Pliny to correct them.<sup>222</sup>

Rome showed strong interests in ensuring the maintenance of public works, the basic needs of the provincials, and the proper application of city finances in Asia Minor. However, resistance and indifference to the upkeep of buildings by provincials required that Rome inspect cities and sometimes organize building maintenance. Also, many cities that lacked even basic supplies were unable to secure them without the help of Roman organizers. Additionally, provincials freely used public funds not for their proper purposes, but irresponsibly and selfishly. This was troubling enough for an emperor to send a legate on a special mission to put an end to irresponsible and illegal municipal spending.

## **Conclusion**

The provinces of Asia Minor presented countless challenges to Roman interests. Many of these challenges, such as unlawfulness and scarcity of resources, can be expected to have appeared in provinces throughout the Empire, but many other challenges, such as intense inter-city rivalry and the allocation of funds for extravagant public building projects, arose particularly because of Greek culture and might only be found in other Eastern provinces.

Although the *Epistulae* of Pliny and the *Discourses* of Dio provide a detailed view of the affairs of provinces in Asia Minor, and especially of Bithynia et Pontus, nevertheless, as Bekker-Nielsen states, “they also reveal how little we know,” especially about local politics and

politicians.<sup>223</sup> Even though we have more evidence with which to piece together the situation in this region than for most others, we lack sufficient evidence to make certain observations and instead must hope to identify tendencies. As much as a few examples of incomplete and rundown building projects or of insufficient access to legal documents for proconsuls may suggest general phenomena, it is always possible for the extant examples to be isolated cases.

Nevertheless, this case study does show that Asia Minor posed significant challenges to Roman interests. It is not surprising that Trajan would send an expert of finances to Bithynia et Pontus, a province notable for financial irresponsibility, nor is it that Dio, an accomplished orator with an understanding of Rome's interests in and perspective of the Greek world that was uncommon for a Greek native, would dedicate himself to preserving political stability so that, as he hoped at least, the Romans would not have to intervene in local affairs. It is difficult to determine how successful Rome was in protecting its interests in Asia Minor, but it is certain that the Anatolian provinces required much attention and care.

## Notes

1. Andrew Lintott, *Imperium Romanum: Politics and Administration* (London: Routledge, 1993), 152.
2. Lintott, 152.
3. Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen, *Urban Life and Local Politics in Roman Bithynia: The Small World of Dion Chrysostomos* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2008), 64-65.
4. Lintott, 43.
5. Carlos F. Noreña, "The Social Economy of Pliny's Correspondence with Trajan," *The American Journal of Philology* 128, no. 2 (Summer, 2007): 239.
6. Giovanni Salmeri, "Dio, Rome, and the Civic Life of Asia Minor," in *Dio Chrysostom: Politics, Letters, and Philosophy*, ed. Simon Swain (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 55; Lintott, 54.
7. Lintott, 146-147; Bekker-Nielsen, 66-74.
8. Bekker-Nielsen, 67-68; Lintott, 187.
9. A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Letters of Pliny: A Historical and Social Commentary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 80-82.
10. Sherwin-White, 80-82.
11. Noreña, 243.
12. Sherwin-White, 525; Greg Woolf, "Pliny's Province," in *Rome and the Black Sea Region. Domination, Romanisation, Resistance*, ed. Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006), 101-102.
13. Sherwin-White, 82, 553; Bekker-Nielsen, 65; Lintott, 54.
14. Sherwin-White, 81.
15. Sherwin-White, 527.
16. Sherwin-White, 553.
17. Woolf, 101.
18. Sherwin-White, 543.

19. Noreña, 244; Lintott, 152; Bekker-Nielsen, 66.

20. Pliny the Younger, *Letters and Panegyricus*, trans. Betty Radice (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1969), 10.18, 10.48.

21. Sherwin-White, 547.

22. For further discussion of the authenticity of Pliny's letters, refer to the following works: Carlos F. Noreña, "The Social Economy of Pliny's Correspondence with Trajan," *The American Journal of Philology* 128, no. 2 (Summer, 2007); Greg Woolf, "Pliny's Province," in *Rome and the Black Sea Region. Domination, Romanisation, Resistance*, ed. Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2006); Tønnes Bekker-Nielsen, *Urban Life and Local Politics in Roman Bithynia: The Small World of Dion Chrysostomos* (Aarhus: Aarhus University Press, 2008).

23. According to Sherwin-White, Prusa ad Olympon "was an underprivileged *civitas stipendiaria* at this time, but had recently become the capital of an administrative *conventus*, and hence the seat of the governor's assizes." (A. N. Sherwin-White, *The Letters of Pliny: A Historical and Social Commentary* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1966), 583).

24. Bekker-Nielsen, 119.

25. Bekker-Nielsen, 119.

26. Bekker-Nielsen, 119-120.

27. Bekker-Nielsen, 119.

28. Bekker-Nielsen, 120-122.

29. Dio Chrysostom, *Discourses*, trans. J.W. Cohoon (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1949), 47.21.

30. Bekker-Nielsen, 132.

31. Bekker-Nielsen, 135.

32. Lintott, 172.

33. Dio, 47.22.

34. Bekker-Nielsen, 171.

35. Bekker-Nielsen, 124-125.

36. Salmeri, 77; Dio, 47.21.

37. Bekker-Nielsen, 120.
38. Bekker-Nielsen, 17, 125-126.
39. Bekker-Nielsen, 126.
40. Bekker-Nielsen, 127.
41. Bekker-Nielsen, 38-39.
42. Bekker-Nielsen, 121-122.
43. Salmeri, 65.
44. Bekker-Nielsen, 122.
45. Pliny, 10.96-97.
46. Sherwin-White, 651.
47. Pliny, 10.65; Sherwin-White, 651.
48. Pliny, 10.66; Sherwin-White, 653-655.
49. Pliny, 10.72-73.
50. Pliny, 10.83-84.
51. Sherwin-White, 604.
52. Pliny, 10.108-109; Sherwin-White, 717.
53. Pliny, 10.112-113.
54. Pliny, 10.96-97.
55. Lintott, 160.
56. Lintott, 192.
57. Pliny, 10.93.
58. Strabo, *The Geography of Strabo*, trans. Horace Leonard Jones (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1960), 14.2.5; Dio, 34.7-8; Sherwin-White, 630.

59. Dio, 44.5, 44.12.
60. Pliny, 10.81; Bekker-Nielsen, 134.
61. Pliny, 10.82.
62. Pliny, 10.58.
63. Pliny, 10.96-97.
64. Lintott, 159.
65. Lintott, 152-153, 192.
66. Pliny, 10.114-115.
67. Sherwin-White, 696-697.
68. Pliny, 10.31-32; Lintott, 152.
69. Pliny, 10.116-117.
70. Pliny, 10.37-38.
71. Dio, 31.
72. Dio, 31.139.
73. Dio, 31.82-83.
74. Dio, 31.86.
75. Dio 31.58, 31.81, 31.87.
76. Dio, 43.11, 50.10.
77. Sherwin-White, 638; Lintott, 97.
78. Lintott, 46; Bekker-Nielsen, 86.
79. Lintott, 106.
80. Lintott, 105.
81. Sherwin-White, 60, 527.

82. Pliny, 4.9.
83. Pliny, 10.56.
84. Sherwin-White, 61, 527.
85. Pliny, 5.20.
86. Pliny, 6.13.
87. Pliny, 6.5.
88. Pliny, 7.6.
89. Pliny, 10.21-22.
90. Pliny, 10.54-55.
91. Sherwin-White, 664.
92. Pliny, 10.75.
93. Sherwin-White, 663.
94. Pliny, 10.76.
95. Lintott, 105.
96. Dio, 38.36-37.
97. Bekker-Nielsen, 86.
98. Dio, 38.36-37.
99. Dio, 36.20.
100. Dio, 46.10.
101. Dio, 46.11.
102. Dio, 48.1.
103. Salmeri, 70.
104. Bekker-Nielsen, 131.

105. Bekker-Nielsen, 131.
106. Strabo, 12.4.3.
107. Dio, 48.1-2, 46.14.
108. Dio, 48.13.
109. Dio, 48.13.
110. Dio, 48.15.
111. Salmeri, 74.
112. Sherwin-White, 610.
113. Pliny, 10.114.
114. Lintott, 149-150.
115. Dio, 38.1, 39.1, 40.1, 40.22, 41.10.
116. Dio, 41.1-2; Sherwin-White, 725.
117. Dio, 44.6, 47.22.
118. Dio, 49.15.
119. Dio, 40.17-18.
120. Dio, D45.9, 47.21, 47.22.
121. Dio, 47.22; Bekker-Nielsen, 171.
122. Dio, 50.10; Bekker-Nielsen, 17.
123. Dio, 43.8-11.
124. Dio, 34.38.
125. Dio, 45.7.
126. Bekker-Nielsen, 126.
127. Dio, 43.11-12.

128. Dio, 48.17, 50.10.
129. Dio, 47.17, 47.18, 47.23.
130. Salmeri, 61.
131. Bekker-Nielsen, 15.
132. Pliny, 10.81-82.
133. Bekker-Nielsen, 135.
134. Bekker-Nielsen, 126.
135. Pliny, 10.39.
136. Sherwin-White, 616.
137. Sherwin-White, 621.
138. Bekker-Nielsen, 14-15.
139. Dio, 36.31-32, 39.2-8, 46.11, 48.6-7, 48.15.
140. Dio, 39; Bekker-Nielsen, 123.
141. Dio, 34.16-17, 34.20.
142. Dio, 34.3.
143. Dio, 45.8, 50.3.
144. Salmeri, 70.
145. Bekker-Nielsen, 14.
146. Pliny, 10.33-34.
147. Sherwin-White, 607-608.
148. Pliny, 10.92-93.
149. Dio, 40.16-17, 40.23-24, 41.7-9.
150. Dio, 40.27.

151. Dio, 34.10.
152. Dio, 34.11, 34.43, 34.45.
153. Dio, 34.14.
154. Dio, 38.
155. Dio, 34.48.
156. Dio, 38.33.
157. Dio, 38.38.
158. Sherwin-White, 527.
159. Dio, 38.15, 39.6-7.
160. Bekker-Nielsen, 15.
161. Dio, 38.7.
162. Dio, 38.22-24.
163. Bekker-Nielsen, 47.
164. Bekker-Nielsen, 48.
165. Dio, 38.34-35.
166. Dio 38.36-37.
167. Bekker-Nielsen, 122-123.
168. Dio, 38.1.
169. Dio, 31.40.
170. Dio, 31.62.
171. Dio, 34.7.
172. Dio, 35.13.
173. Dio, 38.31.

174. Dio, 43.6.
175. Dio, 51.3.
176. Strabo, 12.4.7.
177. Strabo, 12.8.15.
178. Bekker-Nielsen, 122.
179. Dio, 34.19, 34.49-51, 38.6, 38.8-20, 40.22, 40.26, 40.34-41, 41.12-14, 48.6.
180. Bekker-Nielsen, 128.
181. Bekker-Nielsen, 130.
182. Dio, 38.46-47.
183. Dio, 45.13.
184. Pliny, 10.23-24.
185. Pliny, 10.33.
186. Pliny, 10.33-34.
187. Pliny, 10.39.
188. Pliny, 10.39.
189. Pliny, 10.40.
190. Pliny, 10.39-40.
191. Pliny, 10.98-99.
192. Pliny, 10.70-71.
193. Dio, 40.8-9.
194. Strabo, 14.1.21.
195. Dio, 40.7.
196. Dio, 40.2.

197. Pliny, 10.90-91.
198. Pliny, 10.37-38.
199. Dio, 46.10.
200. Dio, 46.8.
201. Sherwin-White, 527.
202. Sherwin-White, 553.
203. Lintott, 152.
204. Sherwin-White, 527; Noreña, 244.
205. Bekker-Nielsen, 45.
206. Bekker-Nielsen, 71.
207. Dio, 48.11.
208. Salmeri, 74.
209. Bekker-Nielsen, 71.
210. Sherwin-White, 675.
211. Pliny, 10.110-111; Lintott, 152.
212. Dio, 47.20.
213. Dio, 47.21.
214. Bekker-Nielsen, 119; Sherwin-White, 720.
215. Sherwin-White, 720.
216. Pliny, 10.39.
217. Pliny, 10.39.
218. Pliny, 10.37-38.
219. Sherwin-White, 583.

220. Pliny, 10.39-40.

221. Pliny, 10.43-44.

222. Pliny, 10.17a, 10.18.

223. Bekker-Nielsen, 165.

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