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The Second Industrial Divide: Possibilities for Prosperity by Michael J. Piore; Charles F. Sabel
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ment, the structure and orientation of the two Korean political systems show a remarkable degree of similarity that has been shaped by military competition, their peripheral position in the world economy, a common political culture, and popular demands for stability, modernization, and democracy.

Although the chapters are of uneven quality, Kihl's *Politics and Policy in Divided Korea* is an evenhanded, thorough, and sophisticated comparison of the political systems of North and South Korea. The book will be useful to anyone interested in Korean politics and American policy towards Korea, as well as to those concerned with divided nations and political change in the Third World.

John Merrill

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It has by now become a commonplace among political economists that we are living through a crisis that marks a transition in the history of capitalism. Michael J. Piore and Charles F. Sabel join in the chorus arguing that we are in such a transition period, what they call a "second industrial divide." However, what is novel in their work is their reluctance to engage in deterministic thinking and to predict, as if there were some necessary or unilinear unfolding to socioeconomic development, what the next stage will be like. Instead, they argue that we face a choice about the direction we can move in, and that the choice is in many ways similar to the choice faced by our ancestors at the beginnings of the industrial revolution. The choice is between continuing along a course of development founded on mass-production technology and its related institutions or recharting our course in the direction of craft production. Their preference is clearly for the latter.

The book makes strange reading to one accustomed to the dominant lines of argument in the current discourse in political economy. It breaks radically with both the form and substance of prevailing analyses of the crisis. Piore and Sabel reject completely systemic models of the economy and their attendant laws or logics of development. Rather they opt for a contingent model of historical development wherein technologies, market strategies, and labor control policies are adopted, sometimes accidentally, sometimes due to the exigencies of events, and sometimes as result of political struggles. For example, they claim that the assembly line, the legal framework of the New Deal years, and the rise of mass industrial unions, were a product of some combination of experimentation, expediency, or fairly random events (like the Great Depression or World War II) and not of any logic of capitalism. Much of the support for this view comes from a revisionist reconstruction of U.S. economic history and from a comparison of the experiences of France, Italy, West Germany, and Japan. I found the historical reconstruction too meager and too conjectural to be convincing. However, the comparisons clearly indicate that the same mass production technology can operate within different labor-control systems. Even here, however, Piore and Sabel are forced to concede that there are great similarities between advanced capitalist countries, and one might have expected this acknowledgment to temper their absolute dismissal of deterministic models of development.

In the substance of their arguments the authors relegate the ideas of Adam Smith and Karl Marx to the sidelines. It is the neglected Pierre-Joseph Proudhon who is resurrected and given center stage. Indeed, in their advocacy for craft-based production ("flexible specialization" is the phrase they prefer), one finds a repetition of many of Proudhon's arguments. In the world of flexible specialization they envision, there is no unbridled and cut-throat cost and price competition, for this would stifle innovation and encourage sweat shop conditions. Instead there is a benign form of competition where firms seek to best each other in innovations and yet consent to share among themselves skills and technological knowledge. Nor do Piore and Sabel have much use for entrenched class conflict in this best of all possible worlds, for the struggle between capital and labor produces rigidities in production and divisions within the community. Instead they foresee cooperation and bargaining based on trust, or, as Proudhon put it, based on respect. Thus capitalists would not take advantage of their greater potential mobility to extract unfair concessions from labor because community pressure would remind capitalists of their responsibilities.

Piore and Sabel see evidence that versions of flexible specialization can flourish in the new intensely competitive conditions of the eighties. They point to the dynamism of the textile districts in northern and central Italy, to the success of the mini steel mills in the United States, and to the federated conglomerate enterprises of Japan. All point in the direction of localism and regionalism; of federations of enterprises linked together in communities of respect, with harmony maintained where necessary by the central government. This happy state may or may not follow this.
period of transition. It all "depends on a thousand imponderables of international politics" (p. 281).

Although there is much to admire in this provocative book (here I think especially of the comparative case studies), the overall argument rests on very fragile supports, and the case made for a "republic of small holders" seeks to dissolve, as if by magic, too many concrete contradictions. One is reminded of Marx's assessment of Proudhon: "he wants to be the synthesis—he is a composite error."

LEON GRUNBERG

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Theories formulated in one sphere of learning can often be modified to illuminate the subject matter of another. In this stimulating volume, Pedro Ramet uses international relations theory to analyze ethnic problems in postwar Yugoslavia.

Ramet argues that "if the federal units of Yugoslavia enjoyed even half as much autonomy as the system's apologists maintained, the pattern of interaction among those units would resemble the pattern of behavior of other collective units operating within a regional system," and "it should be possible to compare the behavioral patterns of Yugoslav federal units and states in the international system" (p. xi). Consequently, the behavior of federal republics and the central government (yet another actor) will be a function of the distribution of power within this system. Ramet derives a set of hypotheses elaborating upon these assumptions with the use of Morton Kaplan's typology of systems of international behavior, specifically the balance of power system.

After descriptions of Yugoslavia's federal institutional structure, the history of Communist party nationalities policy in Yugoslavia, and the policymaking powers enjoyed by the republics, Ramet undertakes a series of case studies of inter-republican and interethnic rivalries since 1963. These studies include the economic reform from 1963 to 1971, the emerging eruption of Croatian nationalist and secessionist sympathies from 1967 to 1972, and outbreaks of Bosnian and Albanian nationalism in the 1970s and 1980s.

Not surprisingly, Ramet finds that contrary to Yugoslav claims, nationalism remains alive among the country's minorities. More interesting is analysis that demonstrates that the Yugoslav federal structure, designed to limit nationalist discontent, itself restricts the courses of action that might be taken to ameliorate the sources of ethnic hostility. Finally, Ramet discovers that interrepublican alliances are fluid, which contrasts with the conventional wisdom that believes wealthier republics normally form one bloc and their poorer neighbors another.

Ramet's approach suffers from some of the same pitfalls evident in international relations theory: the units of analysis are not unified actors but comprise a range of policy demands and desires. Indeed, a group of Croatian conservatives opposed the nominal interests of their republic in the crisis from 1967 to 1972. In addition, although accounts of the crisis in Kosovo and descriptions of the economic problems faced by Yugoslavia are interesting in themselves, at times Ramet loses sight of the connection between the details and his analytical framework.

As Ramet points out, controversies yet exist as to whether Yugoslavia is essentially federalist or unitarist. The volume under review weighs heavily in favor of the latter judgment. The book provides a wealth of information on the policy issues faced by the Yugoslavs, interethnic rivalries, and a series of hypotheses that attempt to account for the problems the Yugoslav political system faces in trying to come to grips with the complexities posed by the national divisions in its society. This book should be read by all students of contemporary Yugoslavia, as well as those interested in the phenomena of ethnicity and nationalism.

STEPHEN R. BURANT

The Library of Congress


This volume describes a sample of 135 revolutionary leaders of 31 violent political revolutions from the English Revolution of the 1640s to several revolutions in progress in 1978, including revolutions from all world regions. It continues, updates, and expands Rejai's 1979 Leaders of Revolution (Sage). To gather the necessary data, the authors had to overcome problems of language, official and revolutionary secrecy, and the determined myth-making of both revolutionaries and their opponents.

Despite the importance of the topic of study and the labor involved, the volume has serious practical, theoretical, and methodological flaws, and so contributes little to our knowledge of revolutionaries. Practically, even taking the