Abstract
A major concern for disaster relief today in the inefficiency of disaster relief efforts by disaster relief organizations (DROs). DROs, as non-profit organizations, rely considerably on donations. Donor-intent often leaves many DROs without the option of optimally allocating and utilizing these donations. Because donor intentions lean more towards immediate disaster relief rather than long term interests such as disaster prediction, prevention, and preparation, there tends to be a surplus of ex post investment and a shortage of ex ante investments for disaster relief. After identifying the economic reasons for a shortage of ex ante donor investment, this paper focuses on how to increase donations to ex ante efforts of DROs, arguing that increasing ex ante investment will help correct the inefficiency of ex post efforts. It concludes that DROs can take either a budget and cost approach or a utility and benefits approach towards increasing ex ante investment.
Date of Completion
12-18-2007
Degree Type
Thesis
Format
URI
http://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/45
Language
English
Rights
Department
Economics
Recommended Citation
DeHart, Katerina Marie, "Providing Donors an Incentive for Ex Ante Investment in Disaster Relief" (2007). Economics Theses. 45.
https://soundideas.pugetsound.edu/economics_theses/45