Title
The Imagination Box
Document Type
Article
Publication Date
5-2014
Publication Title
Journal of Philosophy
Department
Philosophy
Abstract
Imaginative immersion refers to a phenomenon in which one loses oneself in make-believe. Susanna Schellenberg says that the best explanation of imaginative immersion involves a radical revision to cognitive architecture. Instead of there being an attitude of belief and a distinct attitude of imagination, there should only be one attitude that represents a continuum between belief and imagination. We argue otherwise. Although imaginative immersion is a crucial data point for theorizing about the imagination, positing a continuum between belief and imagination is neither necessary nor sufficient for explaining the phenomenon. In addition, arguing against Schellenberg’s account reveals important but underappreciated lessons for theorizing about the imagination and for interpreting boxological representations of the mind.
Volume
111
Issue
5
pp.
259-275
ISSN
0022-362X
WorldCat Link
Provider Link
Citation
Liao, Shen-yi & Doggett, Tyler (2014). The Imagination Box. Journal of Philosophy 111 (5):259-275.